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ABSTRACT 
 
 
How does weak party institutionalization and clientelistic linkage mechanisms affect 
policy responsiveness? Research on representation and responsiveness usually find a 
positive relationship between public priorities and subsequent policy making activities. 
However, most research on this topic assumes the context of strongly institutionalized 
party systems and presupposes that programmatic voter-party relations are prevalent. In 
weakly institutionalized party systems, on the other hand, clientelistic linkage 
mechanisms are the norm.  
Previous studies have suggested that clientelistic linkage mechanisms decrease policy 
responsiveness since non-policy, selective benefits are substituted for the collective, 
policy-based benefits. To investigate the dynamics of representation in a weakly 
institutionalized party system, this dissertation departs from the current literature, and 
focusses on Turkey; a country with a weakly institutionalized party system and 
clientelistic parties.  
This dissertation uses a novel dataset created by collecting and content coding over 
13000 parliamentary documents (laws, parliamentary bills and oral questions) and over 
10000 manifesto sentences as well as the most important problem question of public 
opinion surveys for a period of 11 years. My dissertation will show that parties largely 
relying on clientelistic linkage mechanisms are indeed responsive to the priorities of the 
median voter. The results also indicate that the policymaking agenda is jointly structured 
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by public priorities and party preferences. In this regard, I also offer a new approach to 
measure party priorities which is theoretically more relevant.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
How well does the relationship between public opinion and policy activities work 
in weakly institutionalized party systems where parties often compete by offering 
clientelistic selective goods instead of public goods? Can clientelistic parties be 
responsive to the general public opinion and to their party platforms by developing and 
adopting programmatic policy proposals? 
Parties and party systems are considered programmatic if they compete for votes 
by offering alternative policy proposals that they promise to enact once they assume 
office (Schlesinger 1984; Kitschelt 2000). These policy proposals purport to benefit 
everyone in the society regardless of any person’s particular vote choice. In 
programmatic competition, politicians cannot determine the individuals and groups who 
voted for them, and therefore cannot offer targeted benefits to their current or prospective 
supporters. Voters, on the other hand, are free riders: they enjoy the benefits (but also 
suffer from the costs) regardless of their support for the governing parties (Kitschelt et al. 
2010, 16).  
However, Kitschelt (2000, 849) points out that political parties may offer 
substitute ‘products’ to voters; namely, clientelistic linkages or personalistic linkages. 
Clientelistic linkages rely on distributing selective benefits to individual voters or groups 
of voters who support the party. Personalistic linkages, on the other hand, usually involve 
the exposition of the appealing personal characteristics and charisma of a party’s leaders.  
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The above research questions are important since a strong linkage between the 
public and the policymakers is considered crucial for a healthy democracy. The current 
literature suggests that enhancing the ability of the citizens to select parties and 
candidates that best match their priorities helps to improve democratic accountability 
(Stein et al. 2006). When voters are able to identify parties based on their policies on 
specific issues, “programmatic linkage” mechanisms emerge (Kitschelt et al. 2010).  
 This dissertation offers answers to these research questions by studying Turkey, 
which is a good example of a country where there is clientelism and weak party 
institutionalization. The answers from such a study are not only relevant for the literature 
on representation and responsiveness but also for the democratization literature that 
investigates how and why democracies endure, and whether specific features of parties 
and party systems are beneficial or detrimental in terms of the survival of democracy. As 
Kitschelt et al. (2010) argue: “If democratic consolidation is defined as a significant 
decrease in the probability of reversal to an authoritarian system, then the degree of 
representation may also contribute to this aspect of a young democracy”. 
 Focusing on a weakly institutionalized party system with clientelistic parties, this 
dissertation shows that parties in these systems can be responsive to the general public 
opinion. I also show that even the parties that are considered highly clientelistic can 
develop programmatic policy proposals and act upon them once they are in government. I 
argue that, although high level of clientelism and weak party institutionalization may 
seem inimical to a sustainable democracy, parties can achieve a significant level of 
responsiveness by establishing track-records in the parliament through re-election.  
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Representation and Responsiveness  
During their tenure, governments always face a large number of problems and 
issues compete for space in the political agenda (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005). These issues are very diverse and usually range from the economy, 
health, and education, to law and order, defense and foreign affairs. Since time is a scarce 
resource, governments have to prioritize these issues and come up with policies to deal 
with them. In other words, with this multitude of problems, governments need to make 
choices about their priorities.  
Prioritization of the issues is a complex process. Governments have to respond to 
their electoral mandates, the demands of the political parties, interests groups, public 
opinion and the media (Jennings et al. 2011). While working through this process, 
governments have to choose carefully from the menu of issues since ignoring those areas 
that are salient and important to the public will most likely result in punishment during 
elections. Therefore, parties are expected to take cues from the voters by prioritizing 
those issues that the public deems as important and requiring action. Similarly, parties 
have to keep up with their electoral mandates and carry out their promises.  
A strong linkage between public opinion and policymaking activities (opinion-
policy linkage) as well as between party programs and subsequent policymaking efforts 
(program-policy linkage) is considered crucial for a healthy democracy. A voluminous 
literature has examined these two linkage mechanisms and has usually found a significant 
relationship. However, almost all of these studies have been conducted in developed 
Western countries with strongly institutionalized party systems with programmatic 
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parties. The literature on party institutionalization and programmatic parties suggest that 
parties in these systems target the median voter and compete with each other based on 
programmatic policy proposals by offering public goods. In weakly institutionalized 
party systems, on the other hand, clientelistic parties are the norm.  
The literature on weak party institutionalization and clientelism suggests that the 
target constituency in these systems differs from the strongly institutionalized party 
systems as parties tend to focus on local constituencies and club goods instead of 
appealing to the general public via public goods. The clientelistic linkage mechanism 
employed by parties insulates the policymakers from the policy priorities of their 
constituents since non-policy, selective benefits are substituted for the collective, policy-
based benefits (Epstein 2009). This expectation implies that parties in these systems are 
not responsive to the voters because the linkage mechanism hampers these relationships. 
Although the literature suggests that weak party institutionalization and clientelistic 
parties lead to unresponsive policymakers, no rigorous empirical test have been 
conducted in these systems.  
In this chapter, I first map the current research on opinion-policy and program to 
policy linkage and review the literature on these two fields and address their weaknesses. 
I also place the contributions of this dissertation within the context of the previous 
research and explain the relationship between party system institutionalization, 
clientelism and parties’ and policymakers’ responsiveness. 
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Responsive Policymakers: Opinion-Policy and Program to Policy Nexus 
One of the central functions of the political parties is to establish the connection 
between policy-makers and citizens (Dalton et al. 2005). Recent decades have witnessed 
an increase in the scholarly literature pointing to the eroding power of the political parties 
(Dalton and Wattenberg 2002). In order to preserve their central role in representative 
democracy, parties have to be responsive to the priorities of the voters. This requires 
parties to adjust their policy positions according to the shifts in the public opinion. This 
dynamic representation (Stimson et al. 1995) has become crucial for parties’ survival. 
Newly formed parties can replace existing parties if the latter are not responsive to the 
shifting policy preferences of the electorate (Kitschelt 1988).  
The variants of “mandate theory” date back to the postwar studies on liberal 
democracy, which has now come to be known as “the responsible party model” (APSA 
1950).  An important feature of democracy is the responsiveness of the government to the 
preferences of the public (Dahl 1971, 1). According to this view of representation, elected 
officials are expected to be responsive to the opinions of their constituents.  
In a democracy, politicians and political parties maximize their chances of 
winning elections by formulating their election programs with policy initiatives. In a 
Westminster system, the party receiving the most votes forms the government, and in 
order to secure its re-election, it enacts the policies which brought it success. In other 
words, from the perspective of mandate theory, elections are the main mechanisms 
through which citizens’ preferences are translated into policy activities, and parties 
should deliver the policy commitments they have made during elections when they come 
to power. 
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The literature presents competing views on the nature of party competition. The 
Downsian view of electoral competition contends that parties compete by shifting their 
ideological positions according to the ideological positions of the voters since voters will 
choose the party closest to their ideal point on a single issue dimension (Downs 1957). 
Yet another strand of the literature argues that parties do not shift positions on issues. 
Instead, they compete by selectively emphasizing or deemphasizing certain issue 
dimensions (Budge and Farlie 1983). 
Assuming that issue saliency is a key component of party competition, “an 
important aspect of democratic responsiveness concerns how politicians prioritize 
different issues and how this corresponds with the issue preferences of the public” 
(Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008, 310). Issue salience is crucial for democratic 
responsiveness since individuals who are concerned about a certain issue are more likely 
to consider the elected officials’ actions on those issues when they go to the ballot box 
(Arnold 1990; Jones 1994). This inevitably leads parties to be more responsive on highly 
salient issues.  
Numerous studies have examined the connection between public opinion and 
policy actions and have found a general congruence. Monroe (1979), for example, 
examined the relationship between the majority opinion about a proposed policy change 
and the legislative outcomes and found that, in 63% of the cases, policy moved in the 
public’s preferred direction. Perhaps, one of the most influential studies investigating the 
opinion-policy nexus was done by Page and Shapiro (1983). In their study, the authors 
focused on the period between 1935 and 1979 and found that in approximately two thirds 
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of the cases where policy changes occurred it was in the direction desired by the mass 
opinion.  
In their influential study, Erikson, Mackuen and Stimson (2002; see also Stimson 
et al. 1995) examined the relationship between “public mood” (measured by aggregating 
available public opinion across a wide range of policies into a single global indicator) and 
“policy activity” (measured by using various activities such as House and Senate roll 
calls, Supreme Court rulings and presidential liberalism calculated by taking the mean 
ADA score of policy support group in the Congress for the president). Their findings 
provided perhaps the strongest empirical support for dynamic representation. The authors 
found that as the public mood moved towards a more liberal position, policy activity and 
lawmaking moved in the same direction (304-321). In addition, the estimated impact of 
public opinion was so large that they concluded that “there exists about one to one 
translation of preferences to policy” (316).  
Previous research has found a significant variation in terms of parties’ 
responsiveness. For instance, parties that are more focused on policy are less responsive 
to the demands of the whole electorate and more responsive to that of their supporters. In 
this regard, the niche parties are not responsive to public opinion, whereas mainstream 
parties do respond to changes in public opinion (Adams et al. 2006). Ezrow et al. (2011), 
on the other hand, found that mainstream parties respond to the changes in the mean voter 
position, whereas niche parties respond to the changes in the mean position of the party 
supporters.  
This line of research on policy responsiveness has largely focused on preference 
congruence and examined how the changes in voter preferences affect party positions 
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(Adams et al. 2004; 2006; 2009). The findings of this literature suggest that, in general, 
when the electorate moves in a certain direction on the left-right scale, parties movein the 
same direction.  Although this research has significantly contributed to our understanding 
of the voter-policymaker linkage, it has certain limitations. First, it has not addressed how 
the parties respond to the issue priorities of the public. Second, as will be explained 
below, due to the symbolic nature of the left-right semantics the change in left-right 
stances of both the parties and the voters do not fully reflect a change in issue stances in 
weakly institutionalized party systems.  
More recent studies in the literature, on the other hand, adopt a broader approach 
in focusing on policy priorities, and examining how well those priorities are reflected in 
policymaking activities (Wlezien 1995; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). To explore the 
correspondence between public opinion and the political agenda, Jones et al. (2009) 
examine whether the issues prioritized by policymakers in different policy venues 
(speeches, hearings, bills, laws, budgets, etc.) match those issues prioritized by the 
general public in the US. From a similar perspective, Soroka and Wlezien (2005; 2010) 
extend these studies to UK and Canada and find that the public responds 
‘thermostatically’ to budgetary decisions and that the government follows public 
preferences on spending.  Hobolt and Klemmensen (2005; 2008) also analyze opinion 
policy linkage in UK and Denmark. Using executive speeches and budgetary data to 
measure “rhetorical and effective responsiveness”, the authors find that policymakers are 
responsive to public preferences.  
 This large body of research is quite rich and satisfying for it suggests that there is 
strong representation. Yet, almost all of this research has focused on the United States 
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and a few other Western countries with strongly institutionalized party systems. We do 
not know whether these findings apply to the developing countries with weakly 
institutionalized party systems. To understand how weak party institutionalization and 
clientelism affects the responsiveness of policymakers, we need to focus on the dynamic 
relationship between these phenomena. 
 
Party System Institutionalization, Clientelism and Democratic Representation 
Party competition lies at the heart of democratic politics and political parties are 
considered indispensable for democracy. A sound connection between parties and voters 
is also crucial for a well-functioning democracy. In this regard, the institutionalization of 
party systems and parties is considered necessary for creating and maintaining this 
connection.  
Mainwaring (1999, 22-39) and Mainwaring and Scully (1995) conceptualize four 
dimensions of party system institutionalization. First, compared to the less 
institutionalized party systems, institutionalized party systems exhibit more stable party 
competition. Second, in strongly institutionalized party systems, parties have strong roots 
in the society, and voters both feel strongly attached to the party and usually vote for the 
same party over different elections. This strong association between the voters and the 
party help to stabilize the party system.  
According to Mainwaring and Torcal (2005), the parties’ roots in the society and 
electoral volatility are intertwined since strong party roots lead to electoral stability. As 
voters cast their vote for the same party, there are fewer vote changes, and therefore 
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significant changes in the party composition are highly unlikely. When voters have weak 
roots, on the other hand, electoral change is unavoidable. The third factor is the 
attributing of legitimacy to the political parties. In strongly institutionalized party 
systems, political actors accord legitimacy to parties and view them as indispensable 
components of democratic politics.  
 Lastly, the institutionalization of the party system prevents ambitious leaders from 
subordinating the party organization to their interests, and parties gain independent status 
and value of their own (Huntington 1968, 12-24).  If the party is the personal instrument 
of the leader or a small group of elites then the institutionalization of the party system 
will be incomplete (Janda 1980). Mainwaring defines party systems that are characterized 
by a low degree of institutionalization as fluid or weakly institutionalized party systems.  
Mainwaring and Torcal (2005, 1) underline the lack of attention to the different 
characteristics of these two systems and point out the need for an alternative approach: 
Most theoretical works on voters, parties, and party systems 
implicitly assume the context of the advanced industrial democracies, 
especially of the United States and Western Europe.. . .the literature on 
the advanced industrial democracies cannot account for important 
characteristics of party systems in democracies and semi-democracies 
in less-developed countries. Voters, parties, and party systems in less-
developed countries are qualitatively different from those of the 
advanced industrial democracies. These differences demand a 
reconsideration of theoretical assumptions and lead to the necessity of 
rethinking theoretical problems. More work must be undertaken to 
rethink theories about party systems based on the distinctive 
11 
 
experiences of democracies and semi-democracies in less-developed 
countries. 
 In their study, Mainwaring and Torcal (2005) argue that party systems of new 
democracies and semi-democracies are significantly less institutionalized than those of 
the advanced industrial democracies. Until Mainwaring and his colleagues’ research 
(Mainwaring and Torcal 2005; Mainwaring 1999; 1998; Mainwaring and Scully 1995), 
party system institutionalization has been neglected as a critical dimension for 
understanding party politics. This lack of scholarly attention was probably due to the 
uniform level of institutionalization in advanced Western countries.  
 This lack of attention to the less developed party systems might also stem from 
the fact that there had been a limited number of new democracies and semi-democracies 
until the 1980s (Mainwaring and Torcal 2005; Mainwaring 1999). Party competition in 
these countries was either non-existent or tightly constrained. With the third wave of 
democratization, party competition became an important aspect of democratic life in 
these countries. Therefore the authors urge scholars to pay attention to the dynamics of 
these newly established party systems and develop theoretical tools to analyze them.  
The most appropriate way to develop these tools is to understand the rich 
literature on the developed industrial countries and to critically challenge and modify it in 
order to understand the parties and party systems of the democracies of the less-
developed countries (Mainwaring 1999). Scholars also argue that weak party 
institutionalization has several significant effects on representation and electoral 
accountability (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). First, it is prone to creating anti-party 
politicians such as Hugo Chavez. Also weak party institutionalization has a negative 
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effect on electoral accountability as party labels do not have value voters cannot easily 
identify the responsible party officials.  
Based on the four dimensions of party system institutionalization mentioned 
above, Mainwaring and Torcal (2005) underline three specific differences between 
institutionalized and weakly institutionalized party systems. The first difference is the 
high electoral volatility and low levels of electoral stability compared to the advanced 
industrial democracies.  
 Second, much of the scholarly work on party politics relies on the context of the 
institutionalized party systems, which have strong roots in the society and assumes that 
programmatic or ideological linkages form the basis of stable linkages between voters 
and parties. However, these assumptions do not hold for party systems in the developing 
democracies since ideological and programmatic linkages in these systems are quite 
weak. In this respect, weaker programmatic and ideological linkages between parties and 
voters lead to weaker party roots in the society.  
 The third difference between the strongly institutionalized and weakly 
institutionalized party systems is the prevalence of personalistic linkages between voters 
and politicians in the latter. In weakly institutionalized party systems, more voters base 
their voting decision on the personal appeals of the candidates, making ideology or 
programmatic appeals less important.  
To sum up, thanks to the renewed scholarly attention, party system 
institutionalization and clientelism have been studied on a variety of aspects, such as their 
effect on partisanship (Dalton and Weldon 2007) and campaign finance (Booth and 
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Robbins 2010). Other studies have focused on regions such as Africa (Kuenzi, and 
Lambright 2001; Lindberg 2007), Latin America (Dietz and Myers 2007), East Europe 
(Bertoa 2014) and Asia (Croissant and Volkel 2010) and tried to determine the level of 
institutionalization. However, the relationship between clientelism, party system 
institutionalization and representation has been understudied.  
It is widely accepted in the literature that programmatic citizen-politician linkage 
mechanisms and electoral competition based on programmatic policy proposals deliver 
better results for representation and are more acceptable to electoral constituencies than 
the clientelistic and charismatic linkage mechanisms (Kitschelt et al. 2010, 29). Similarly, 
scholars have argued that the combination of at least a moderately stable party system 
with programmatic alternatives creates the basis for a durable democracy with mass 
support (Huntington 1968; Linz and Stepan 1996). Clientelistic and personalistic linkage 
mechanisms, on the other hand, are usually considered to be detrimental to democratic 
representation. 
Although the literature suggests a weak representational linkage in clientelistic 
and weakly institutionalized party systems, few studies have empirically tested this 
assumption. Luna and Zechmeister (2005) are among the few scholars who have actually 
empirically examined the relationship between party system institutionalization and 
representation. In their study, the authors argued that greater institutionalization of a party 
system enables representation, and that therefore, in these systems, individuals are more 
likely to link with parties on the basis of issues. In this respect, a high level of party 
system institutionalization leads to higher levels of representation. Similarly, when 
electoral competition is centered on individual candidates’ qualities and personality, 
14 
 
politicians may rely less on their political parties’ programmatic stances for electoral 
support. Therefore, politicians lack the incentive to create coherent and well-structured 
party platforms on which to compete. (Luna and Zechmeister 2005, 394). 
The authors’ findings lend some support to their argument. However, as they 
point out, their study is limited since their measure of representation is limited to a 
measure of issue congruence between party supporters and party legislators at a single 
point in time and does not consider policy output (Luna and Zechmeister 2005, 99). In 
addition, the wordings of the elite and mass survey questions were quite different which 
led the authors to make arbitrary choices and select variables that represent similar policy 
considerations. Lastly, their measures focus on the preferences instead of the priorities of 
the public and the policymakers. 
An important strand of the literature relies on spatial models of voting, and tries to 
determine the policy congruence between voters and policymakers based on their stances 
on several issues summed under a single left-right dimension (Adams et al. 2004; 2006; 
2009). As mentioned earlier, this research strategy might not be able to provide reliable 
results since the left-right semantics in weakly institutionalized party systems do not offer 
a reliable measure for policy preferences. 
 
The Spatial Approach and its Usefulness in Weakly Institutionalized Party Settings 
Spatial models of voting behavior are one of the most significant and powerful 
approaches in terms of explaining voter-party relations. It is widely accepted that, 
ideological labels are an important component of programmatic party competition. They 
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provide shortcuts for the voters and help them to make informed choices when they go to 
the ballot box. Most studies that focus on the relationship between public opinion and 
policy responsiveness use the spatial approach, which relies on left-right placements of 
voters and parties. However, applying the same strategy to the weakly institutionalized 
party settings with clientelistic parties poses some serious problems and is very likely to 
create biased results.  
The literature on voting behavior has been heavily relying on the assumption that 
voters and parties are programmatically connected. Research on proximity and 
directional voting, studies on left-right semantics (Fuchs and Klingeman 1990), social 
cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) and party realignments in the developed Western 
countries (Inglehart 1990) rely on this assumption. 
 Directional spatial models differ from proximity spatial models. According to the 
directional proximity approach, voters choose candidates or parties on the basis of 
positional congruence. However, citizens cast their vote not according to their proximity 
on the left-right scale, but rather according to the parties’ ideological orientation on a few 
issues about which voters care the most (Rabinowitz and MacDonald 1989).  
 Other major strands of the literature on parties implicitly assume programmatic or 
ideological voting. Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) famous social cleavage theory, for 
example, assumes that voters identify their interests in accordance with their social class, 
religion, ethnicity or nationality, as well as urban/rural residence.  
All of these theories overlook the non-programmatic and non-ideological 
motivations that voters might have (Kitschelt 2000).  First, voters might make their 
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voting decision on the basis of clientelistic goods instead of programmatic goods. In this 
case, voters may choose a politician that is ideologically further away from his position, 
yet offers a clientelistic good which can significantly advance his material interest.  
Second, these theories also overlook the fact that voting might be personalistic instead of 
programmatic.  Again in this case, voters may cast their votes not on the basis of 
ideological or programmatic preferences but rather because of sympathy for the personal 
traits of the candidates. This type of voting behavior inevitably weakens the bonds 
between the voter and the party.  
According to Kitschelt et al. (2010), ideological labels may have at least two 
components: symbolic and substantive. The symbolic component references political 
groups without being associated with the policy stances of those groups. Since the 
political groups associated with the symbolic component are usually political parties, this 
component is also labeled as partisan (Kitschelt et al. 2010, 61-62).  
As opposed to the symbolic or partisan component, the substantive ideological 
label reflects the cleavages in the society. In this context, a left-right divide also enables 
scholars’ ability to predict a person’s stance on a variety of issues. For example, one can 
make a prediction about an individual’s policy stance on social policy simply by looking 
at his left-right placement.  However, the usefulness of the left-right semantics depends 
on the interconnectedness between parties’ or politicians’ policy stances on key issues, 
and their willingness or ability to place their party on the left-right dimension. (Kitschelt 
et al. 2010, 62). When this linkage is strong, the programmatic content of the left-right 
semantic will be more useful. If a symbolic component dominates, then the utility of left 
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right labels for guiding programmatic vote choice in that country is diminished; the use of 
left-right would signal only a party name.  
In party settings that are programmatically structured, the substantive component 
is dominant. In the Turkish context, the connection between left-right semantics and party 
policy positions is often weak and sometimes reversed (Aydogan and Slapin, 
forthcoming), which makes it harder to establish a programmatic connection between 
parties and voters.  
 
Turkey as a Case of Weak Party Institutionalization and Clientelism 
Based on the above definitions and arguments, Turkey presents an excellent 
example of weak party institutionalization and clientelism. According to the Democratic 
Accountability and Citizen-Politician Linkages dataset created by Kitschelt (2013), the 
governing Justice and Development Party is ranked as the most clientelistic party among 
506 parties from around the world. Furthermore, 5 out of the 7 Turkish parties in the 
dataset were above the mean clientelism score.  
Turkey is also a relevant example in terms of the personalistic linkage 
mechanisms. Since the founding of the AKP, Tayyip Erdogan has been its leader and he 
has also served as Turkey’s prime minister. President Erdogan is renowned for his 
charismatic leadership style. During his tenure, AKP campaigns have largely relied on 
Erdogan’s personality traits, such as being a man of his word, honest, and fearless. His 
personal charisma has been one of the main reasons for the AKP’s success (Sambur 
2009). 
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This quantitative evidence along with the qualitative literature presents the 
clientelistic nature of Turkish politics.  We can therefore see that Turkey is a perfect case 
study to investigate the representation and responsiveness in a weakly institutionalized 
party setting.  The following chapter will present additional data and explain in detail the 
choice of this country. 
By examining the impact of weak party institutionalization and clientelism on 
representation and responsiveness, this dissertation represents a significant departure 
from the current literature and makes several contributions. First, it introduces a novel 
dataset using a wide range of activities. Unlike most studies, which employ roll call data 
to analyze the responsiveness of the legislators or legislative parties, my study employs a 
variety of legislative data including laws, parliamentary bills and oral questions.  
This rich dataset enables us to analyze the preferences and motivations of the 
parties and offers a better way to measure strategic party choice. While roll call data can 
be useful to uncover parties’ positions for particular dimensions such as left-right or 
government-opposition, it is less effective at measuring party priorities on each issue. In 
addition, the utility of the roll-call analysis outside the US, and especially in the European 
democracies, is highly questionable (Hug 2009; Carruba et al. 2006). This dataset has the 
potential to fill a huge gap by providing researchers institutional data on a transitioning 
democracy. In addition, it uses a common coding scheme applied in 18 countries, 
ensuring the comparability of the findings with the relevant literature. Also, this 
measurement strategy and data are more likely to create reliable results than the measures 
that rely on left-right policy stances. 
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Second, it goes beyond a limited type of governmental activity. So far, most of 
the studies on opinion-policy responsiveness have used budgetary data and executive 
speeches (Wlezien 2003; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2005). Although useful, this approach 
is limited.  Policymaking consists of a series of stages, spanning from agenda setting to 
enactment. Constraining the policy activities to only budgetary data limits our 
understanding of policy responsiveness. It also ignores the role of the opposition parties 
in the policy making process.  
Discounting the role of opposition activities inside the legislature prevents 
scholars from seeing the full picture regarding party competition. Although in 
parliamentary democracies most opposition activities seem to be inconsequential in terms 
of producing legislation, they provide a unique forum in which the government is forced 
to respond directly to the issues and framing of those issues as predominantly raised by 
opposition parties (Green-Pedersen 2010). In this context, as Hall (1996, 29) argues, “the 
view that position taking and other forms of symbolic action are irrelevant politically 
simply because they are inconsequential legislatively, is difficult to justify unless one’s 
sole concern is the prediction of outcomes, not the practice of representation”.  
Third, in terms of the empirical analyses, it offers an alternative method to 
measure party preferences that is theoretically more relevant. Instead of using all 
mentions in the manifestos, we focus on those sentences which propose a clear, tangible 
policy proposal and code these sentences according to their specific policy area. This 
way, we are able to measure the true priorities of the parties.  
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Fourth, this dissertation broadens our understanding of opinion-policy 
responsiveness by moving beyond developed Western countries. So far, almost all studies 
that investigate the opinion-policy linkage focus on developed Western countries with 
highly institutionalized party systems and dominantly programmatic parties. However, as 
the literature on programmatic and clientelistic parties suggest (Epstein 2009; Kitschelt 
2011; Kitschelt and Singer 2011), parties in weakly institutionalized party systems tend 
to use clientelistic linkages to gain office. In other words, unlike programmatic parties, 
who appeal to the general public with programmatic proposals and by offering “public 
goods,” clientelistic parties focus on narrow sets of constituencies and rely on selective 
incentives and club goods. In this respect, this dissertation rigorously tests the claim that 
the clientelistic linkage mechanism employed by parties insulates the policymakers from 
the policy priorities of their constituents since non-policy, selective benefits are 
substituted for the collective, policy-based benefits (Epstein 2009). 
Lastly, my dissertation fills an important gap by bridging the two literatures that 
examine how well representation works. Bringing together the research on opinion-policy 
and program-policy linkage, this dissertation offers a broader approach to the issue of 
representation. Previous studies have treated these two mechanisms as different, when in 
reality the parties’ political agendas are jointly determined by these two forces 
(Vliegenhart et al. 2013; Froio et al. 2013). 
To sum up, in order to estimate the effect of weak party institutionalization and 
clientelism on the dynamics of representation, this dissertation will focus on the 
following questions: 
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I. Are parties in weakly institutionalized party systems responsive to the 
priorities of the general public? 
II. Are parties responsive to their electoral mandate when they are in the 
parliament? 
III. Is there any variance between parties in terms of their level of 
responsiveness to the public opinion and their party platform? 
To address these questions, I collected an original dataset which contains over 
13000 parliamentary documents (laws, parliamentary bills and oral questions) and over 
10000 manifesto sentences as well as the most important problem question of public 
opinion surveys for a period of 11 years. In order to obtain measures of public 
preferences, party preferences and party issue focus in the legislature, these documents 
have been hand-coded according to the common coding scheme of the Comparative 
Agendas Project. These measures enable us to analyze how well representation works in 
a weakly institutionalized party system. Our results will show that the policymakers in 
these systems can be responsive to the general public opinion and their electoral mandate, 
but there is variation between parties. Also the results show that the measurement of 
party preferences matters in terms of revealing the true degree of responsiveness. 
The organization of this dissertation is as follows: Chapter two presents Turkey as 
a case for studying representation and responsiveness in a weakly institutionalized party 
setting. This chapter explains the emergence and evolution of the Turkish party system, 
and underlines the causal reasons for its weak party institutionalization and clientelism. 
This chapter also pays specific attention to the ruling AKP, tracing its roots to the 
emergence of political Islam in Turkey. The causes and consequences of this process and 
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its effects on representation are also discussed. This chapter aims to make the reader 
familiar with the Turkish politics from the onset of Turkish democracy until today. The 
chapter also underlines the clientelistic nature of Turkish party politics and provides 
qualitative and quantitative evidence regarding clientelistic linkage mechanisms. 
Chapter two also discusses the data collected in order to familiarize the reader 
with parliamentary procedures in Turkey. I also discuss, in more detail, the selection of 
the documents to be coded (laws, bills and oral questions), the training of the coders, and 
procedures followed during the process.  This chapter also presents information about the 
Comparative Agendas Project as well as the Turkish Policy Agendas Project under which 
the data was collected.  
 Chapters three, four and five are the empirical chapters of the dissertation. 
Chapter three focuses on the relationship between public opinion and policy activities. 
This chapter analyses how well the priorities of the public is reflected in various policy-
making channels and whether there is variance in terms of representation across different 
channels.  
 Chapter four repeats the same analyses at the party level. Previous studies have 
shown that parties may differ in terms of their level of responsiveness to public opinion. 
Especially niche parties tend to be less responsive to general public opinion. Based on 
these findings, this chapter examines the opinion-policy linkage at the party level and 
tries to uncover the variance among different parties (Ezrow 2010).  
 Chapter five further develops the empirical analyses by analyzing how parties 
respond to their electoral mandate as well as to the general public opinion. This chapter 
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convincingly shows that parties not only pay attention to the priorities of the public, but 
also focus on their electoral pledges. This chapter also offers an alternative approach to 
analyzing the relationship between party mandates and legislative activities. Chapter six 
concludes by summarizing the main findings, suggesting new venues for further research, 
underlining the weaknesses and strengths of the current literature.  
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Chapter 2: Introducing the Case and the Data 
 
 
This chapter introduces Turkey as an example of weak party institutionalization 
and clientelistic linkage mechanisms. It starts with the history and evolution of Turkish 
parties and explains the factors that created the weakly institutionalized party system. 
This chapter also elaborates on the clientelistic appeals of the Turkish parties, reviews the 
relevant literature, and discusses the dynamics that led to the establishment of clientelistic 
linkage mechanisms between voters and parties. The chapter pays specific attention to the 
ruling AKP and traces its roots to the pro-Islamic party tradition which started in 1960s. I 
also present evidence from a recent dataset that ranks AKP as the most clientelistic party 
among 506 parties in 80 electoral democracies.  
The second part of this chapter presents the data that are collected and coded for 
this dissertation. In this respect, I discuss the data collection and coding process as well 
as the common coding system of the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP).   
 
The Emergence and Evolution of Turkish Parties 
The history of modern Turkish politics dates back to the 19th century when the 
Tanzimat Reform was accepted in 1839. This series of reforms was inspired by European 
ideas and intended to transform the empire from the old system based on theocratic 
principles to that of a modern state. The adoption of the Tanzimat and the civic equality it 
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promised paved the way for the formation of the New Ottoman Society in 1865 which 
later became the famous Society for Union and Progress (Ittihat ve Terakki) in 1889. The 
prominent members of the Society were called “Young Turks” which was also used to 
define the political movement that aimed to replace the absolute monarchy of the 
Ottoman Empire with a constitutional monarchy. 
Following the adoption of the 1876 constitution, which was the first constitution 
written in accordance with the European model, the country experienced short periods of 
partisan competition between 1908-1912 and 1918-1919. These brief episodes of 
electoral and party activity were interrupted by the absolute rule of Sultan Abdulhamit II 
(1876-1908) and military dictatorship of the Committee of Union and Progress (1913-
1918).  
Party politics during the last years of the Ottoman Empire were deeply affected by 
the religious and the ethnic divides in the society. During the Young Turk period, parties 
were clustered around three ideologies which reflected the divisions in the society: 
Turkism, Ottomanism and Islamism (Rustow 1996). Turkism was largely supported by 
the Young Turks and was based on Pan-Turkic ideas, whereas the supporters of Islamism 
argued that the Empire could only survive through the union of Muslim nations. 
Ottomanism, on the other hand, relied on the idea of equal citizenship regardless of ethnic 
and religious background. 
After the defeat in the First World War, the Empire lost almost all of its non-
Muslim territories. This inevitably led to the disappearance of the Ottomanism ideology. 
Further, the invasion of the Arabian Peninsula by the British and French forces left the 
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empire with Anatolia whose population was dominantly Muslim and Turkish. In this 
respect, the result of the First World War deeply affected the ideological base of the party 
competition as Turkism came out as the strongest ideology (Rustow 1996).   
After the end of the war, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who was one of the few 
victorious generals in the Ottoman army, started the War of Independence. Almost three 
years of national resistance resulted in a Turkish victory which strengthened the position 
and reputation of Ataturk. After the war, Ataturk formed the People’s Party which was 
renamed the Republican People’s Party (CHP) after the abolition of the sultanate. The Six 
Arrows in the party flag represented the six ideological tenets of the party: republicanism, 
nationalism, populism, secularism, revolutionism, and etatism. These six tenets were 
written into the party program in 1935 and into the Constitution in 1937 and in a sense, 
became the official ideology of the Turkish Republic.  
After Ataturk’s death, his close friend Ismet Inonu assumed the leadership of the 
CHP. The single party rule was continued by Inonu until the end of the Second World 
War. After the war, transition to democracy was inevitable as Turkey wanted to be a 
member of the NATO and strengthen its ties with the Western world against the manifest 
threat of aggression from Soviet Russia. However, the established bureaucracy and CHP 
elites did not welcome the idea of free electoral competition (Rustow 1996). An early 
election was called in 1946 with the aim to catch the newly founded Democratic Party of 
Adnan Menderes unprepared. In addition to the timing of the election, the irregularities in 
its conduct guaranteed the defeat of the DP.  
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 As opposed to the 1946 elections, 1950 elections were fair and resulted in the 
resounding victory of the DP. The victory of the DP in the 1950 election and Inonu’s 
decision to respect the results of the election marks the beginning of a new era of multi-
party competition in Turkey. The period following the transition to democracy had also 
introduced several factors that eventually led to the weak party institutionalization. Sayari 
(2008) defines three non-electoral sources of weak party institutionalization in Turkey: 
military interventions, party closures by the constitutional court and frequent party 
switching.  
 
Military Interventions and Party System Change 
Military interventions can be considered as one of the most significant sources of 
party system instability in Turkey. Since the transition to democracy in the late 1940s, 
Turkey has experienced three military coups (1960, 1971 and 1980) and two indirect 
interventions. Although electoral politics and party competition have survived these 
military interventions, the party system became more unstable. The Turkish military did 
not have the ambition to directly rule the country through a military dictatorship, 
therefore, the military interregnums in Turkish politics have been relatively short. After 
the 1960 coup, the military remained in power for seventeen months. It took almost two 
years to return to the civilian life after the 1971 coup, and the longest period was three 
years after the 1980 coup. Although the military officials returned to their posts after each 
coup, they also made sure to secure reserved domains through which they were able to 
influence the government. Military generals often sought to use their influence in the 
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name of defending the country’s territorial integrity as well as its constitutional order 
(Sayari 2008).  
 Turkey experienced its first military coup in 1960. The coup was the result of a 
highly polarized political system, the oppression of the opposition through government 
force, the discontent of the military with the DP administration, and military’s close ties 
with the opposing CHP. The escalation of the political conflict between DP and CHP 
accompanied by student protest demonstrations in Ankara and Istanbul against the 
government led to a bloodless military coup. The 1960 coup was conducted by junior 
officers, and the majority of the military committee was formed by colonels and majors.  
The 1960 coup had several significant effects on the Turkish party system. The 
most important impact was the dissolution of the DP, which governed the country for 10 
years, and the banning of its leaders from political activities. DP could be considered the 
driving force of the early democratization efforts, and it not only had popular support, but 
also led the process of rapid party organization.  
 The banning of the nation’s largest party that had an average of 52 percent 
electoral support caused a significant damage to the party system. The period right after 
the military coup witnessed the trial of the entire parliamentary group of DP, execution of 
its leader Adnan Menderes along with two other cabinet ministers, and banning many of 
its members from political activities. This military strategy was designed to engineer the 
party system from above, and it had disruptive consequences leading to considerable 
instability in the early 1960s (Sayari 2008).  
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 The DP’s sudden disappearance from the political arena created a big gap in 
Turkish politics, especially in the center right. As a result, several new parties claiming to 
be the inheritor of the DP were founded. The strongest of these parties, the Justice Party 
(AP), came out as the victor in this competition and secured the loyalties of the former 
DP. Apart from wiping one of the two major parties from the political arena, the military 
junta also changed the electoral system and the constitutional rules regarding party 
competition. Until the coup, the electoral system was based on a plurality system with 
multi-member electoral districts. The new constitution, which was drafted by a 
constituent assembly formed by the military junta, altered the electoral law from plurality 
to proportional representation based on the largest average d’Hondt formula. This change 
expectedly benefited the small parties and increased their chance of getting seats in the 
parliament. In the switch from plurality to the PR system created factional split inside the 
major parties. As a result of the increased fragmentation in the party system, in the 1961, 
elections four parties with a vote share of 10 percent or more entered the parliament. The 
new structure of the parliament marked the end of an era where single party governments 
were dominant and started a period of coalitions.  
The 1960 coup also widened the spectrum of the ideologies in the political arena. 
Thanks to the expansion of the civil liberties by the newly drafted 1961 constitution, 
radical left and right parties were able to compete in the elections. In the 1965 elections, 
the newly formed extreme left Marxist Turkish Labor Party (TIP) entered the parliament. 
After four years, the radical right gained parliamentary representation through the 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP). The late 1960s also witnessed the founding of the pro-
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Islamist National Order Party (MNP) along with the Unity Party (BP) which aimed to 
represent the rights of the Alawi citizens.  
 The 1960 military intervention did not fully eradicate the party system and the 
party base of the DP as the newly formed JP inherited the party organization and the 
electoral support of the DP. However, the coup seriously hampered the 
institutionalization of the party system and paved the way for future military 
interventions. To sum up, the 1960 military coup had been a major source of party system 
change. It lead to the transition from a two party system to a multi-party electoral 
competition and expanded the ideological spectrum in the political arena.  
 The second military coup in modern Turkish history took place in 1971 in the 
form of a military memorandum. This time the main reason for the military coup was the 
growing radical left activism in the military and the factional conflict caused by it. To 
avoid a possible coup by the factions inside the military who became increasingly 
discontent with the government policies, the army issued a memorandum and asked the 
then Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel to resign and dissolve the government 
immediately. Unlike the 1960 coup, the Parliament was not closed. Instead, the military 
closely oversaw the political process through a civilian government formed by military 
backed technocrats. The two major parties, CHP and AP, continued to function and 
maintained their organizational structure, whereas two radical parties, the Marxist TIP 
and pro-Islamist MNP, were banned. The constitutional amendments of 1971 and 1973 
led to the reversal of some progress that was achieved thanks to the 1961 constitution.  
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 The third military coup took place in 1980 and led to the longest military rule 
since the beginning of multi-party politics. The years preceding the 1980 coup witnessed 
major political and economic crises, political violence and terrorism, and growing 
numbers of civilian deaths caused by social turmoil. The political and social situation was 
worsened due to the economic and financial crisis. These events paved the way for the 
military intervention and enabled the Junta leaders to make a case about the necessity of 
the intervention. According to the Junta members, the political parties were the main 
reason for the turmoil and crisis in the country, and therefore, they had to be banned and 
dissolved.  
With all parties banned from politics, Turkey entered a new era of politics where 
military aimed to design the party system from above (Sayari 2008). This project 
involved the creation of a two party system with centrist parties, one of which was going 
to be led by a retired general. To make sure that no other parties entered the system, the 
military administration did not allow the newly formed parties with ties to parties of the 
pre 1980 era to compete in the 1983 parliamentary elections. However, the military 
permitted a third party with no link to the previously banned parties, the Motherland 
Party (ANAP) to enter the elections, thinking that it would not get a significant amount of 
the vote.   
The election result revealed the miscalculation of the junta leaders, as ANAP 
secured the majority of the seats in the parliament. The two parties supported by the 
military failed to gather popular support and vanished from the political arena in the 
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following years. In addition to this failure, the leaders of the pre-1980 parties won their 
political rights through a referendum in 1987 and resumed their political life.  
Although the military failed to design the political system, its policies had 
significant impact on the party system. The military coup led to the emergence of a new 
party (ANAP) that dominated the political arena by ruling the country through a single 
party government from 1983 to 1991. Whether ANAP could have attained a large number 
of popular votes if the 1980 military coup had not happened remains a puzzle (Sayari 
2008). Obviously, the coup led to the transformation of the party system from polarized 
to moderate pluralism and paved the way for single party governments ending the era of 
coalitions. Moreover, splits in the center right and left emerged. The center right, which 
was dominated by AP until 1980, ended up with two rival parties: ANAP and the newly 
formed True Path Party (DYP). The center left, which was dominated by CHP, ended up 
with two parties: the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) and the Democratic Left 
Party (DSP). These splits in center left and right politics were a product of the military’s 
political design project rather than the social cleavages in the society (Sayari 2008).  
 To sum up, the instability caused by the military interventions and the military’s 
attempts to ban most of the political parties led to high levels of volatility, reduced levels 
of party identification among the electorate and the undermining of the organizational 
strength of the major political parties which resulted in a weakly institutionalized party 
system (Sayari 2007).  Moreover, the military regime adopted a new electoral law after 
the 1980 coup, introducing a 10 percent electoral threshold in an attempt to reduce the 
fragmentation of the party system and curb anti-system parties. Even this new law could 
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not prevent the high level of fragmentation, as five to six parties, of relatively equal 
strength, made it to the parliament in the 1991, 1995, and 1999 elections.  
 
The Impact of Party Closures 
The second major non-electoral source of party system instability in Turkey was 
the banning of the political parties by the Constitutional Court. Turkey’s Constitutional 
Court is the principal institution that has the authority to oversee the activities of the 
political parties. Since its establishment in 1962, the court has closed 25 political parties. 
Six of these took place between 1962 and 1980; 19 parties were closed in the period from 
1983 to 2014. The 1990s in particular witnessed an increase in the number of parties that 
were banned.  
This highly restrictive tendency of the Constitutional Court during the 1990s was 
not surprising as this was a period of heightened pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamist activism. 
The banning of the pro-Kurdish parties did not have a major impact in terms of 
parliamentary representation since they managed to enter the parliament only after the 
2007 elections. The closing of the pro-Islamist parties, on the other hand, did have 
significant impact on the political process and led to radical changes. For example, the 
vote share of the FP decreased to 15.4 percent (compared to RP’s 21.4 percent). 
According to Sayari (2008) this decrease stemmed from the “wasted vote syndrome” 
which is caused by the unwillingness of the electorate to vote for a party that faces the 
prospect of being banned again.  
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Party Switching 
Party switching by elected representatives is the third important non-electoral 
source that led to weak party institutionalization. The level of party switching has varied 
greatly since the beginning of multi-party competition. From 1946 to 1980, the average 
rate of party switching was 10 percent. During this period, the volatility reached its peak 
in the 1960s as the 22, 21, and 23 percent of the representatives elected in the 1961, 1965, 
and 1969 elections respectively abandoned their parties. The number of representatives 
who switched their party affiliation was 92 (out of 400) in the parliament following the 
1969 election (Sayari 2007). 
The level of party switching increased even more in the 1980s and 1990s. During 
the period between 1983 and 2002, the rate of party switching was 32 percent. The 
number of party switchers reached its peak in the 1995-1999 parliament when 260 out of 
550 (47 percent) legislators changed their parties (Sayari 2008). Table 2.1 shows the 
electoral volatility in Turkey between 1987 and 2002, whereas Table 2.2 shows the 
governments formed after the 1980 military coup, which illustrates the instability in the 
1990s and relative stability in the post 2002 AKP era.  
Table 2.1 Electoral Volatility in Turkey 1987–2002 (in percentages)  
Period Total 
Volatility 
Intra-bloc 
Volatility 
Inter-bloc 
volatility 
Inter-bloc volatility 
as percentage of 
total volatility 
1987-91 18.1 16.2 1.9 10 
1991-95 15.3 8.2 7.1 46 
1995-99 19.3 11.8 7.5 39 
1999-2002 50.2 34.7 15.5 30 
Mean 25.7 17.7 8.0 31.2 
 
Source: Sayari (2007:200) 
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Table 2.2: Governments in Turkey, 1983-2012 
Period Type of Government Governing 
Party/Parties 
Prime 
Minister 
Dec1983–Dec1987 Single party/majority ANAP Ozal 
Dec 1987–Sep 1989 Single party/majority ANAP Ozal 
Sept 1989–June 1991 Single party/majority ANAP Akbulut 
June 1991–Dec 1991 Single party/majority ANAP Yilmaz 
Dec 1991–June 1993 Coalition/majority DYP, SHP Demirel 
June 1993–Oct 1995 Coalition/majority DYP, SHP Ciller 
Oct 1995 Single party/minority DYP Ciller 
Oct 1995–March 1996 Coalition/majority DYP, CHP Ciller 
March 1996–June 1996 Coalition/majority ANAP, DYP Yilmaz 
June 1996–June 1997 Coalition/majority RP, DYP Erbakan 
June 1997–Jan 1999 Coalition/majority ANAP, DSP, DTP Yilmaz 
Jan 1999–May 1999 Single party/minority DSP Ecevit 
May 1999–Nov 2002 Coalition/majority DSP, ANAP, MHP Ecevit 
Nov 2002–Aug 2007 Single party/majority AKP Gul, Erdogan* 
Aug 2007-June 2011 Single party/majority AKP Erdogan 
June 2011- Aug 2014 Single party/majority AKP Erdogan 
Aug 2014- Single party/majority AKP Davutoglu 
*Gul served as the Prime-Minister for a brief period (3 months). 
Source: Turkish Grand National Assembly website 
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The Rise of Pro-Islamic Parties and Emergence of the AKP 
The AKP’s roots can be traced back to the National Order Party (MNP) which 
was formed by Necmettin Erbakan in 1970. MNP is considered the first party with clear 
Islamic credentials. Only after one year of its establishment, the party was banned by the 
Constitutional Court following the 1971 military intervention. However, the National 
Salvation Party (MSP) was formed by the same leadership in 1973. MSP remained a mid-
sized niche party in the 1970s with its vote share never exceeding 12 percent. Despite its 
moderate size, MSP managed to be a crucial player in coalition politics between 1973 
and 1980 by taking advantage of the parliamentary arithmetic and inherent hostilities 
between rival parties.  
 Erbakan served as the deputy prime minister in the Ecevit (center-left) and 
Demirel (center-right) governments. Following the military coup in 1980, the party was 
closed down again and returned to the political arena under the name of the Welfare Party 
(RP). The Welfare Party managed to get 7.2 percent of the votes in the 1987 national 
election. Allying with the far right Nationalist Action Party, the party increased its vote 
share to 16.9 percent in 1991.  The 1990s was a period of rapid rising for the party. The 
two biggest cities of Turkey, Istanbul and Ankara, elected RP mayors, and the party won 
over 19 percent of the national vote. December 1995 elections marked the peak for the 
Welfare party as the party increased its vote share to 21.4 percent and secured 158 seats, 
becoming the largest party in the Turkish Parliament. 
The nature of the RP’s success had been largely debated. Although the party had 
successfully combined religious and non-religious appeals, its Islamist background and 
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unclear rhetoric about the restoration of a new government system based on sharia law 
led rival parties, as well as the media, to focus on this dimension of the party.  
To be more specific, RP’s 1995 campaign platform called the then current 
political system a “fraud” and a “dark-room regime” and declared its intention to 
establish a genuinely pluralistic democracy. Despite the party’s mention of a pluralistic 
democracy, scholars argued that the version of democracy it envisaged was more 
majoritarian than pluralistic (Ozbudun 2006). Also the party leaders’ loyalty to 
democratic politics was questioned as Erbakan and other party leaders often stated that 
democracy was not the aim, but only a means to achieve the ultimate goal of establishing 
the “order of happiness”—a reference to the time of Prophet Mohammed.  In terms of 
economic policies, RP offered a third way as an alternative to socialism and capitalism: 
just order (adil duzen).  
In foreign policy, RP’s Islamist ideology was clearly identified. The party 
advocated closer ties with other Islamic countries, an Islamic common market, and 
Islamic versions of the prominent international organizations such as NATO and 
UNESCO (Ozbudun 2006). The Party’s rhetoric in terms of foreign policy was heavily 
anti-Western and anti-Zionist. Also, RP leadership opposed Turkish membership in the 
European Union, describing it as a Christian Club.   
 After the victory in the 1995 elections, RP formed a coalition with the center right 
True Path Party (DYP), and Erbakan became the prime minister. Soon after the formation 
of the coalition, tensions emerged between the military and the bureaucratic elites and the 
government. Later in the process, universities and prominent civil society organizations 
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joined the alliance against the RP-DYP Coalition, claiming that RP’s true aim was to 
abolish secularism and to establish a religious state.  
Problems became more visible after the infamous National Security Council 
meeting on February 1997, where the military generals harshly criticized the government 
and demanded dramatic measures to curb the effect of religion in the public sphere. Some 
of the demands included: banning of the religious cults, closing down the middle school 
part of the Imam-Hatip schools which offer religious in addition to modern education, 
transferring the administration of the Qur’anic courses to the Ministry of National 
Education, and maintaining strict control over the dress code in government buildings, 
and public and private schools, as well as universities.  
The following months did not show a decrease in tension between the military 
and the government. On June 1997, Prime Minister Erbakan resigned from his duty to 
give his place to his coalition partner Tansu Ciller hoping that this change would decrease 
the tension between the government and the military. However, in the process, 37 
legislators resigned from DYP, and several of them formed a new party. With the 
resignations, the RP-DYP coalition lost its majority in the Parliament, and a new 
government was formed without these two parties. In the later years, the Secretary 
General of the National Security Council Tuncer Kilinc stated that the resignation of the 
DYP legislators prevented a military coup (Baki 2009). 
 After losing its place in the government, RP was eventually banned by the 
Constitutional Court on the grounds of violating the secularist principals of the Turkish 
Constitution. Interestingly, the European Court of Human Rights also upheld the Court’s 
39 
 
decision. Following the ban, the Virtue Party (FP) replaced RP. Since Erbakan was also 
barred from politics for a period of five years, Recai Kutan, who was a close associate of 
Erbakan, became the party leader. FP’s political life was also rather short as the 
Constitutional Court closed it down in 2001 for similar charges. The closing down of the 
Virtue Party also started the process that eventually led to the founding of the AKP. 
Unlike the previous bans in the history of the Islamist Party, the FP split into two 
factions: “innovationists” (yenilikciler) and “traditionalists” (gelenekciler).  
 The innovationists founded the AKP under the leadership or Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan in August 2001. The traditionalists, on the other hand, founded a new party 
called the “Felicity Party” (SP) led by the former leader of the banned FP. After almost 
15 months since its founding, the AKP managed to get the 34.3 percent of the votes and 
two-thirds of the parliamentary seats, whereas the SP could only get 2.5 percent. 
Although the party’s number of seats was inflated due to the country’s imbalanced 
election system and the high electoral threshold (10%), the 2002 election result was 
considered a huge success for AKP. The subsequent government formed by AKP was the 
first single party government since 1991.  
To sum up, the pro-Islamic parties have been quite successful in terms of 
increasing their vote share despite the frequent interventions to the party system1. Clearly, 
the AKP represents a significant departure from the pro-Islamic party tradition both in 
terms of its vote share and its policies, and the post 2002 period of Turkish party politics 
deserves closer attention. 
                                                          
1 See the Appendix for the vote shares of the pro-Islamic parties over time. 
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The Post 2002 Era: Rising Clientelism and Dominance of AKP 
The 2002 parliamentary elections marked the beginning of a new era in the 
history of Turkish party politics. The AKP has benefitted greatly from the diminishing 
popularity of its rivals in the 2002 parliamentary elections. The founders of the AKP 
were convinced that the pro-Islamist policies, and strategies were doomed to lead to the 
banning of the parties. Therefore they tried to differentiate the AKP from the SP by 
moderating its ideological stance and party program. An illuminating example is the pro-
European Union approach adopted by the party. While the Islamist parties led by Erbakan 
had been strongly opposed to the EU and considered it as a Christian Club, AKP 
emphasized strong support for EU membership and placed it at the center of its party 
program.  
There were several reasons for AKP’s ideological moderation and its electoral 
success. First of all, the previous experience showed that the strategies followed by 
Erbakan created tensions with the state elites, and adopting the same strategy would 
probably result in another ban. The joining of the several high profile center-right 
politicians from DYP and ANAP into the party also helped to attract many voters from 
the center right electorate. The popularity of AKP leader Tayyip Erdogan and his strong 
connection with the common people, especially the urban poor, also contributed to the 
AKP’s success.  
AKP also inherited the strong grassroots organization of the pro-Islamic party 
tradition and had large numbers of dedicated party activists. Financially it had the support 
of a growing number of conservative businessmen. The electoral victory of the AKP 
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coupled with the high election threshold, made it the dominant party in the Turkish party 
system. The consecutive electoral victories of the party not only strengthened its place in 
the Turkish party system, but also increased its influence in governmental institutions. 
This inevitably enabled good access to political patronage which is regarded as an 
important power to win elections in Turkey (Gumuscu 2012; Sayari 2007).  
 
Effective Use of Clientelism in Turkish Politics 
Studies on contemporary Turkish politics often make references to the clientelistic 
nature of elections in Turkey. The clientelistic behavior in Turkey shows itself in 
different shapes and forms. In the Eastern part of Turkey, for example, the tribal lords 
have traditionally been very powerful and commanded a large amount of the electorate, 
and therefore received government benefits in return for votes. In other parts, political 
parties have offered clientelistic goods to voters in exchange for electoral support. The 
Turkish media frequently reports news regarding the clientelistic politics. For example, 
during the 2008 election campaign, the media often reported on the distribution of 
household goods such as refrigerators and dishwashers by the local government officials 
to the residents of Tunceli, a poor province where AKP had failed to gain electoral 
success. 
Although the AKP has been very successful in term of using clientelistic linkage 
mechanisms, clientelism is hardly a new phenomenon in Turkish politics. Historically, 
clientelism has been a part of society dating back even to the Ottoman era. With the 
emergence of the CUP, members of the prominent families entered the Ottoman 
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parliament. The CUP formed its party organization by relying on these influential 
members and systematically using patronage (Rustow 1996). After the establishment of 
the modern Turkish Republic, the CHP adopted a similar strategy and recruited the 
members of the leading local families as members of the parliament and leaders of the 
local party organization. Using these ties, the CHP was able to control the rural 
population via the local patrons who maintained clientelistic ties with their peasant 
clienteles (Sayari 2011). Although CHP used clientelistic ties, the lack of competitive 
elections prevented it from distributing clientelistic goods to large numbers of people.  
 After the beginning of multi-party elections in the late 1940s, clientelism had 
become a widely used electoral strategy and played a very significant role in Turkish 
politics. Two major parties CHP and DP largely relied on local patrons to mobilize the 
electorate and used their clientelistic relations to form the local party organizations 
(Sayari 2011). As parties strengthened their local and national organization, the 
distribution of benefits to the voters started to take place through these organizations 
instead of the traditional patron-client relations. In this respect, the distribution of state 
resources through party organizations for electoral support became an important tool for 
political parties (Ozbudun 1981). During the single party government of the DP, 
clientelism and patronage became an established component of Turkish politics.  
 The DP government was very successful in terms of using clientelism for 
electoral success. During its tenure, the party used its access to state resources to reward 
those who voted for it with electricity, new roads, water, and other public works. The DP 
administration also used these means to punish the opposition dominated areas by 
43 
 
withholding them. Other parties, which came to power after the DP, followed its example 
to varying degrees. Since the beginning of the multi-party competition, Turkish parties 
have used state resources for distributing to those who support them and depriving those 
communities that support rival parties. Employment in the public sector has traditionally 
been one of the most important sources of clientelism in Turkey. The use of the public 
sector employment has varied greatly from high-ranked positions in crucial state agencies 
to employment as workers in government-run industries.  
An illuminating example regarding the extent of clientelism in Turkish politics is 
presented in the example of the Social Democratic Party which was the government 
partner between 1991 and 1993. During this time period, the party leader (and Deputy 
Prime Minister) Erdal Inonu received 110,889 personal petitions from the Turkish public. 
33,795 of which (or 30.5 percent) asked for a job while another 7,740 (6.9 percent) 
requested monetary help (Schuler 1999). 
 Apart from public sector employment, Turkish parties have also used 
socioeconomic assistance, such as providing coal, food, or household appliances to the 
urban poor. Governing parties have also used lucrative government contracts as a means 
to gain the financial support of the business sector which was also used in distributing 
clientelistic goods.  
To sum up, the nature and form of clientelism has changed significantly over time 
in Turkey. In early stages of the multi-party competition, clientelism was largely confined 
to the rural population. However, the rapid urbanization has created a class of urban poor 
combined with the strengthened party organizations at the local and national level paved 
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the way for large scale clientelistic politics. In order to gain the votes of this large social 
class, parties had to offer goods that will mitigate their socioeconomic problems. In this 
respect, the pro-Islamist parties have been more successful compared to their rivals. 
According to Sayari (2011, 13) the success of these parties largely relies on the fact that 
they were able to replace vertical ties of clientelism with frequent face-to-face interaction 
between party workers and their neighbors. This strong base of party workers, coupled 
with state resources, created a new network of clientelism which played a major role in 
AKP’s success.  
Although the fiscal crisis of 2001 and the strict IMF programs that put restrictions 
on government expenditures had reduced the resources for clientelism for the first years 
of the AKP government, the rapid economic growth and successful economic policies in 
the following years provided AKP the necessary means for clientelistic policies. The 
level of AKP’s clientelistic politics is also evident from the number of green card holders. 
The Green Card program covers healthcare expenditures of those earning less than one-
third of the minimum wage. The card is given after a thorough investigation and is 
renewed every year. In 1992, when the program was initiated, it covered only inpatient 
healthcare expenditures. In 2004, outpatient expenditures and in 2005, drug expenses 
were also included in the coverage (Erus and Aktakke 2011).  
According to the answer provided to a parliamentary question that was directed to 
the Minister of Health, the number of green card holders increased from 10 million (in 
2000) to 14.5 million (in 2007). However, the increase in the number of cardholders is 
not as striking as the increase in the expenses. The total amount spent for the program 
increased 18 times between 2000 and 2007.  
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It should be noted that the successful clientelistic policies of the AKP cannot be 
regarded as the sole reason for its electoral success. The weakness and fragmented nature 
of the opposition parties have also benefited the AKP. Center left CHP has been the main 
opposition party in the parliament since 2002. However, AKP’s dominance in terms of 
seat shares marginalized the CHP in the parliament, and the party had little influence over 
the political outcomes. In addition to its weakness in numbers, CHP has also suffered 
from intra-party factionalism which further reduced the effectiveness of the party. Unable 
to affect the policymaking through parliament, the CHP relied on its historical ties with 
the military and civilian bureaucracy.  
An acute example of CHP support for military influence is the infamous military 
manifesto which was uploaded to the official website of the Turkish Armed Forces in 
April 2007. In the manifesto, the army revealed its discontent with the direction towards 
which the country was heading and implied that it would not hesitate to intervene if it felt 
that the secular state was in danger. In the following days, CHP officials supported the 
memorandum instead of condemning it stating that they would also “sign the 
document”.2 AKP, on the other hand, condemned the memorandum and called for early 
elections which resulted in another victory for the party.  
The qualitative literature on Turkish politics clearly presents the clientelistic 
nature of Turkish parties. However, additional information is needed in order to be able 
to assess the level of clientelism from a comparative perspective. In addition to the 
qualitative literature, there is also convincing quantitative evidence that strongly confirms 
the high level of clientelism. 
                                                          
2 For more details see: http://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/ilicak/2012/04/18/27-nisan-ve-chp 
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The Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP) offers a unique 
opportunity to compare the clientelistic linkage mechanisms in a large number of 
countries. The project was initiated and carried out by a group of investigators in the 
Political Science Department at Duke University. The research involves data collection in 
more than 80 electoral democracies. The expert surveys for data collection were done in 
2008 and 2009. 
The research instrument employed in the project is an expert survey that covers 
the extent to which democratic accountability proceeds through exchanges based on 
broad collective goods and large club goods, and on goods targeted to individuals and 
small groups in detail (Kitschelt 2011). The experts are consisted of scholars mostly from 
political science departments who are experts about their country’s parties, campaigns, 
and elections since they teach or research these subjects in their professional life.  
The clientelism score of individual parties is calculated by summing up the 
answers to five questions each of which measure a different aspect of clientelistic linkage 
mechanisms. 3  According to the DALP dataset, the governing AKP is the most 
clientelistic party in the dataset. The level of clientelism is striking considering that the 
dataset has over 500 parties. This quantitative evidence largely confirms the qualitative 
literature that underlines the clientelistic nature of Turkish party politics.   
To sum up, the qualitative literature on Turkish politics as well as comparative 
quantitative evidence convincingly presents the weak party institutionalization and 
clientelism inherent in Turkish party politics. The second part of this chapter focuses on 
                                                          
3 See the Appendix for the five survey questions used to measure clientelistic linkage mechanisms. 
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the data that will be used to analyze the representational link between policymakers and 
the public in this highly clientelistic and weakly institutionalized party system. 
 
The Data 
The data for this dissertation is collected and coded according to the common 
coding system of the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP). The original Policy Agendas 
Project was initiated by Bryan Jones and Frank Baumgartner in 1993. The project aims to 
provide better measurement of key concepts in the study of public policy. The difficulty 
to trace changes in policy activity within particular policymaking areas across longer 
periods of time had led the CAP scholars to create datasets which would provide 
consistent and reliable measures of policymaking activity within policy categories. The 
CAP framework enables researchers to rigorously assess the extent to which activities 
had changed from one time period to another.  
CAP extends the original Policy Agendas Project topic system, developed for the 
United States, to other nations. The project classifies events (such as bills, parliamentary 
questions, executive speeches, media stories) for topic, makes it possible to study the 
frequency of such events, and enables detailed examination of particular events. The 
coding system consists of 21 major topics and over 200 subtopics. Table 2.3 presents the 
major topics of the CAP coding system. Extensive and detailed coding enables reliability 
in comparing issue attention, across different decision-making venues and between 
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nations.4 While coding each item, the coders strictly followed the general guidelines of 
the CAP coding system.5  
 
Table 2.3: Main Topics of the Comparative Agendas Project 
1. Macroeconomics 
2. Civil rights 
3. Health 
4. Agriculture 
5. Labor 
6. Education 
7. Environment 
8. Energy 
9. Immigration  
10. Transportation 
12. Internal affairs and justice 
13. Social policy 
14. Housing 
15. Commerce and industrial policy 
16. Defense 
17. Science and technology 
18. Foreign trade 
19. International affairs 
20. Government and public administration 
21. Public lands and water management 
23. Culture 
Note: There are no topics coded under 11 and 22 according to the CAP coding system  
 
To measure public priorities, we relied on the “most important problem question” 
of the public opinion surveys. Party manifestos were used to measure parties’ issues 
priorities before they enter the parliament.  
In accordance with the coding scheme of the CAP project, we collected and 
content coded the laws, parliamentary bills and oral questions for the period between 
                                                          
4 For more information see: http://www.comparativeagendas.info/ 
5 See the Appendix for the important guidelines that are originally determined by the American Policy 
Agendas Project (PAP Codebook 2014: 3-4) and directly taken from the project’s website.  
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2002 and 2013. Table 2.4 shows the number of observations for each policymaking 
channel. Together these datasets include more than 13.000 records. The data were 
gathered from the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s (TGNA) website as well as from 
various staff members of the parliament.6 To code parliamentary questions and laws, we 
have used their title. The titles of the oral questions and laws are usually long and 
detailed which enable easy coding. In those situations where the title was not enough to 
understand the content of the question, we have referred to the actual document which is 
available in the Parliament’s website. For the parliamentary bills, we have used the short 
summaries of the parliamentary bills.  
 
Table 2.4: Policy Making Channels 
Policy Making Channel 
Laws        ~1,700 
Parliamentary bills       ~3,500 
Oral questions       ~8,300 
 
 
Each law, bill, question, and manifesto sentence is coded according to the relevant 
issue area giving a measure of aggregate issue attention of various actors. For example, if 
a bill is related to the issue of crime, the coders code it to the category 12 as well as to the 
relevant sub-category such as 1203. If it is related to government operations, it is coded 
                                                          
6 Some documents were provided as pdf documents. To transform these to excel files, we have used a 
custom made text parsing program.  For text parsing, text was extracted to ‘txt’ files from ‘pdf’ files by 
using acrobat reader (http://get.adobe.com/reader/). To analyze the data, text was reformatted and 
standardized to excel format. For this purpose, a simple interface was designed by using C# programming 
language in Visual Studio (2010) (http://www.visualstudio.com/). This tool read the files and created the 
columns to analyze the data in excel. 
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to category 20 etc. To illustrate, Table 2.5 presents sample bill summaries along with the 
main topic and sub topic assigned to them.  
 
Table 2.5 Sample Bill Coding 
 
 
Party  The Short Summary of the Bill Subtopic Main Topic 
AKP 
The bill proposes school supplies and medical drugs to 
be exempt from the value-added tax. 107 1 
BDP 
The bill proposes the establishment of a commission 
on gender equality. 202 2 
BDP 
The bill proposes a change in the Turkish code of law 
in order to ensure the punishment of those who force 
the medical personnel into unlawful acts. 324 3 
CHP 
The bill proposes to postpone the credit debts of the 
farmers and farmer unions 402 4 
CHP 
The bill proposes the retirement age to be decreased to 
50 for mine workers 503 5 
MHP 
The bill proposes to establish a new government 
university named "Adana Technical University".  601 6 
CHP 
In order to establish an educational system in OECD 
standards, this bill proposes the kindergarten to be 
compulsory for kids aged between 60 to 72 months. 602 6 
CHP 
This bill proposes that the environmental criminal 
court to have jurisdiction over all disputes that have to 
do with the environment. 700 7 
CHP 
The bill proposes to provide stimulus packages for 
industries using alternative energy resources such as 
solar, wind geothermal and biomass energy. 802 8 
BDP 
The bill proposes to provide free healthcare for 
immigrants and asylum seekers. 900 9 
DSP 
The bills proposes the public transportation to be free 
for students.  1001 10 
CHP 
The bill proposes changes in the criminal law in order 
to prevent the violence against women. 1208 12 
AKP 
The bill proposes harsher sentences for sexual 
harassment.  1210 12 
CHP 
This bill proposes providing monthly salary and free 
healthcare to families with handicapped members. 1304 13 
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Table 2.5 Continued  
Party  The Short Summary of the Bill Subtopic Main Topic 
MHP 
The bill proposes the recording of every phase in the 
construction of a building and provides a "building 
identity card" to ensure close inspection.  1400 14 
MHP 
The bill proposes new regulations for the foundation, 
business and inspection of retail companies.  1521 15 
CHP 
The bill prohibits banks to charge customers annual 
credit card fees or account fees. 1504 15 
CHP 
The bill proposes to provide a monthly "honor 
salary" to the veterans regardless of their social 
security status.  1608 16 
CHP 
The bill proposes a change in the electronic signature 
law in order to enable legal personalities to use 
electronic signature. 1700 17 
AKP 
The bill prohibits the usage of foreign currency in 
domestic trade. 1808 18 
BDP 
This bill proposes the attorneys with 18 or more 
years of experience to be given green passport. ** 1929 19 
AKP 
The bill proposes to give 5 days of leave of absence 
to government employees who lost their spouses, 
parents or siblings. 2004 20 
AKP 
The bill proposes allocating a certain share of the 
general budget to the city council and municipality 2001  20 
MHP 
The bill proposes the district of Kozan to become a 
province. 2001 20 
CHP 
The bill proposes to change the name of the 
"Sincanli" district (Afyon province) as "Sinanpasa". 2001 20 
CHP 
The bill proposes to lower the 10% national election 
threshold to %5.  2012 20 
AKP 
The bill proposes the Seyhan Lake area to be given a 
National Park status in order to protect the natural 
environment surrounding the lake. 2101 21 
CHP 
The bill proposes the "Madimak Hotel” to be 
redesigned and transformed into a museum and 
renamed as "Martyrs of Democracy Museum".  2300 23 
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We have also content coded the election manifestos of the governing party (AKP) 
and the main opposition party (CHP) according to the same framework. We have also 
identified and coded the election pledges in each manifesto which led to the coding of 
more than 10000 manifesto sentences.7 To code the manifestos, we have used the natural 
sentence rather than the quasi sentence (QS). The decision to use natural sentences 
instead of the widely used QS approach is based on the findings of Daubler et al. (2012).  
Using QSs instead of natural sentences certainly offers a tradeoff. The main aim 
of the QS approach is to capture all relevant political information contained in the 
sentence and to identify multiple policy propositions. However, the identification of the 
QSs by human coders is highly unreliable. In this respect, if there is no meaningful 
difference in terms of the measured political content, natural sentences should be 
preferred to avoid the possible unreliability of human unitization (Daubler et al. 2012). 
By comparing the validity of expert-coded text analyses based on exogenous versus 
endogenous text units from a reanalysis of CMP manifestos, Daubler et al. (2012, 947) 
find the following: 
 
Using natural sentences rather than quasi-sentences as units of analysis 
does not affect the validity of the classification of these units following 
deterministic unitization. Indeed, we demonstrated that endogenous 
unitization so rarely results in multiple and  differently coded QSs within 
one natural sentence unit that even random allocation of codes to the 
larger natural sentence units resulted in essentially the same aggregate 
results – suggesting that the reliability of coding has little potential to be 
adversely affected by the switch to natural sentence units. The 
                                                          
7 A detailed explanation of the coding of manifesto sentences and pledges is provided in Chapter 5.   
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implication of these results for applying categorical coding schemes to 
political text is clear and simple. Natural sentences can be substituted for 
QSs to achieve a major gain in the reliability of text unitization without 
loss of validity. This implies that future text coding projects should 
dispense with endogenous text unitization by human experts as part of the 
coding process, and move to fully automated unitization based on natural 
sentence delimiters defined exogenously as part of the research design. 
Since our estimates suggest that substantive findings are unlikely to be 
affected by doing this, but reliability is likely to increase, the shift to 
natural sentence unitization could usefully be extended to the ongoing 
CMP and PA projects. Our analysis here implies that a substantial gain 
in reliability, efficiency and replicability can be achieved without 
sacrificing important substantive information in the texts under 
investigation.  
Following Daubler et al. (2012), I use natural sentences as the unit of analysis to 
avoid possible pitfalls of human text unitization. The four datasets have been coded by 
the same four coders. The coders went through about a month of intensive training in the 
coding system where examples and problems where discussed. Several rounds of 
reliability tests were then conducted where the four coders coded the same documents. 
The training was stopped when the level of inter-coder reliability had reached 85% at the 
sub-topic level. Coders were also continuously supervised through the coding process 
allowing them to ask questions about coding of specific activities. Finally, a special 
variable allowed coders to indicate cases where they were in doubt about the coding, and 
these cases were then checked and sometimes recoded by the supervisors. When a 
decision could not be made by the supervisors, we have requested help from the 
American Policy Agendas coding team.  
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As mentioned above, the data covers the period between 2002 and 2013. The 
decision for the time period was made due to a couple of reasons. First and foremost, 
there is no public opinion data available before 2002. This prevents us from conducting 
an analysis before 2002. Second, data availability is problematic for the period before 
2000 since the online archiving of government documents is a relatively new 
phenomenon in Turkey. Third, the last ten years have seen less electoral volatility and 
more stability in terms of party competition as the same party is ruling the country for ten 
years, and the same parties entered the parliament in the last two elections. As pictured 
earlier, in the pre-2002 era, early elections and coalition breakdowns were almost an 
inherent feature of Turkish politics.  
As mentioned earlier, the data uses three policymaking channels: laws, 
parliamentary bills, and oral questions to measure the issue focus of different actors. This 
research strategy enables us to adopt a broader approach in terms of representation and 
responsiveness and allows us to see the variation across different policymaking channels 
as well as different actors. 
 
Laws 
Laws are straightforward measures of the government agenda. They have direct 
influence on policy and therefore are considered reliable measures. Lawmaking is not 
only a tool for enacting substantive policy outputs, but also an opportunity for agenda 
setting and for signaling the priorities of policy makers (Bevan and Jennings 2013). The 
unification of executive and legislative powers in the Turkish political system, combined 
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with high levels of party discipline, suggests that there should be a close link between 
executive and legislative agendas and the other outputs of government. In other words, 
unlike coalition governments, single party government with a large parliamentary 
majority enabled AKP to pass almost any laws the cabinet wanted to pass. Free from the 
problems of complex coalition bargaining and without having to make compromises to 
coalition partners, the laws passed during AKP’s tenure of government should reflect the 
government’s preferred policies.  
The data regarding laws has been collected from the TGNA website and from 
staff members when necessary. The coders used the long titles of the laws to code them 
into the relevant categories.  
 
Parliamentary Questions 
Legislation is an important function of the parliaments, however, in most 
countries, the legislative process and the laws are primarily dominated by governments 
(Ström et. al 2003). Therefore, legislative activities of opposition parties do not tell us 
much about their issue prioritizations.  
There are several reasons that make parliamentary questions an ideal tool to 
measure the issue focus of parties. First of all, it should be noted that time is a scarce 
resource for the MPs. This scarcity should lead the MPs to be more careful in their 
legislative activities. MPs should be selective in which topics to bring about the 
parliamentary agenda. Along the countless number of issue topics, the MPs should make 
a strategic decision to opt out some issues and to pick others. In this regard, continuous 
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issue prioritization under circumstances of scarcity turns the issues parties decide to 
address in parliament into a powerful instrument to reveal the mechanisms of 
parliamentary action (Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2011). 
Using parliamentary questions has several advantages in terms of the issue 
competition and selective emphasis approach. First, opposition parties are freer to ask the 
questions they see as being advantageous to them. Unlike roll call votes, parliamentary 
questions enable us to measure the true issue priorities of the opposition parties. There 
are very few structural limits to these questions (such as the word limits for oral 
questions), and opposition parties are free to ask the questions that will benefit them and 
potentially harm the government. Oral question can also be used for a variety of reasons. 
They are also widely used by the individual legislators as a means to represent their local 
interests and to exercise constituency service (Martin 2011). 
Oral parliamentary questions provide an effective tool for government oversight 
by the TGNA. This right is based on the 98th article of the Turkish Constitution.  In 
Turkish politics, oral questions are widely used especially by the opposition parties. Both 
the oral, and the written questions are referred to the prime minister or the relevant 
minister by the speaker of the Turkish TGNA. Oral questions must not exceed 100 words 
and cannot have any attachments. According to the Rules of Procedure (RP) article 16, 
questions are put on the agenda five days after the referral date to the relevant ministry. A 
minimum of one hour at the beginning of each session of at least two working days of 
every week is reserved as a special time for oral questions. The prime minister or the 
relevant minister can answer the question within five minutes. The questioner may 
request additional information from her seat, and the spokesperson can use an additional 
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five minutes to answer the additional question(s). The spokesperson has the right to 
answer multiple questions jointly, provided that they are related.  
 
Bill Initiation Data 
Bill initiation data is also a valuable way to determine the attention of the 
opposition parties. In most parliamentary democracies, opposition parties do not have the 
power to influence the law-making process. Yet, MPs from opposition parties continue to 
propose bills or amendments to the bills proposed by the government. Although this 
seems like a futile effort, in reality, bill initiation is a convenient way of influencing the 
parliamentary agenda.  
Although most opposition bills do not even make it to the floor, they provide 
valuable information to the constituents. In other words, opposition parties use bill 
initiation as a means to go on the record that they actually “care” about the issue, and 
they are striving to bring that issue to the parliamentary agenda. This way, opposition 
parties not only increase the saliency of the issue, but also build a record and send the 
constituents a “message.” Brauninger and Debus (2009, 805) also underline the fact that 
bills are not only drafted for the sake of being enacted, but they are also intended to 
signal to voters that viable alternatives to the government’s policy agenda exist. 
Similarly, intra-party factions or backbenchers within the governing parties may use bills 
to raise their proﬁle and gain support from their constituents to enhance their chances of 
re-election (Brauninger and Debus 2009).  
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Every member of the TGNA has the right to propose legislation. The bill draft 
must have the signature of the initiator. The grounds for the proposal must also be 
included in the draft along with the text. The bills that have been rejected by the floor 
cannot be proposed one year after the rejection date.  
 
Measuring Public Preferences 
To measure the preferences of the public, we use the most important problem 
survey question. The MIP question has been widely used in the literature to measure 
public preferences or public’s attention as well as the broader public salience of issues 
(see McDonald et. al 2004; Jones and Baumgartner 2004; 2005; Pennings 2005). Survey 
organizations have been asking about the most important problem facing the nation for 
many years. Gallup first asked the question in the United States in 1935 and in the UK in 
1947. The advantage of this survey question is that it has been asked in several polls and 
election surveys across the world and repeated over time. Thus, it can be used for cross-
national and cross-temporal analyses. Moreover, it captures the public’s prioritized 
concerns with different policy areas on the “popular agenda” (Pennings 2005, 34).  
Despite its wide usage, the MIP measure is still debated in the literature and 
scholars argue that it is not the perfect measure for the public’s preference for specific 
policies (see Wlezien 2005). Jennings and Wlezien (2011), for example, underline the 
difference between the most important problem and the most important issue questions. 
According to the authors, an important issue refers to something that people care about 
such as health, economy or education. Conceptually, a problem is different as it captures 
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the importance of an issue and the degree to which it is a problem. In this respect, 
something can be a problem but of little importance, and something can be important but 
not a problem. Both of these components are needed for something to be an important 
problem (Jennings and Wlezien 2011, 47). Although conceptually these questions seem 
to be different, the analysis of these measures shows that they are strikingly similar and 
capture the same things.  
Despite all of its limitations, the most important problem question remains the 
best and oldest available indicator of the public’s prioritization of the focus of 
government attention and activities on particular topics (Jennings and John 2009). It is 
confident to say that the MIP question at least provides a measure of what is in public’s 
mind although we are not sure how well it corresponds to their preferences.  
The policy priorities of citizens are estimated on the basis of the survey question, 
“What do you think is the most important problem facing our country today?”  
Respondents are asked to mention which policy problem they see as the most important 
and salient. The data for the MIP comes from the Eurobarometer surveys. Unfortunately, 
this survey question had not been asked regularly in Turkish public opinion surveys.  
Eurobarometer’s poll question about the most important problem is the most continuous 
time series measure of public opinion in Turkey as the question has been asked since 
2002. Before 2002, Eurobarometer did not administer this question in Turkey on a 
regular basis, and therefore, the data is not available.  
 To translate Eurobarometer polls into issue attention percentages, we followed 
three steps following Jones et al. (2009). First, we coded each answer according to the 
CAP main topics. Second, for each poll, we calculated the percentages of every issue 
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category. Finally, we aggregated the data annually by taking average values in those 
years where multiple polls were conducted. Table 2.6 shows the question wording and 
options for the most important problem question. 
 
Table 2.6: Eurobarometer Most Important Issue Question and Options 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
As this chapter has demonstrated, the Turkish party system is weakly 
institutionalized and highly clientelistic. The frequent military interventions, banning of 
the political parties by the constitutional court, and high levels of party switching are 
identified as three major sources of weak party institutionalization (Sayari 2008). Another 
What do you think are the two most important issues facing our country today? 
1. Crime 
2. Public Transportation 
3. Economic Situation 
4. Rising Prices/Inflation 
5. Taxation 
6. Unemployment 
7. Terrorism 
8. Foreign Affairs 
9. Housing 
10. Immigration 
11. Healthcare System 
12. The Educational System 
13. Pensions 
14. Protecting the Environment 
15. Energy Related Issues 
16. Government Debt 
17. Climate Change 
18. EU’s influence in the World 
19. Other 
20. None 
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inherent feature of Turkish party politics is the high level of clientelism. The roots of 
clientelistic voter-politician relations can be traced back to 1950s when multiparty 
competition started. Over the last decade, clientelism in Turkish politics has reached 
higher levels. Thanks to the consecutive national and local election victories, the AKP 
consolidated its power and increased its influence on the governing institutions. This 
consolidation of power combined with the abundance of financial resources let the AKP 
to increase the level of clientelism to greater levels. 
AKP’s clientelistic tendencies are also evident from a comparative perspective. 
According to the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project dataset, the AKP is the 
most clientelistic party among 506 parties, and Turkey ranks as the fifth most clientelistic 
party system in the dataset.  This finding not only supports the qualitative literature on 
Turkish politics, but also shows that Turkey offers a great case for the study of 
representation and responsiveness in a clientelistic environment.  
The data collected for this dissertation offers a unique opportunity to study the 
effect of clientelism and weak party institutionalization on representation. To ensure a 
broader approach to the study of representation, we have coded a large amount of items 
from several policymaking channels ranging from oral questions, parliamentary bills to 
laws. The following chapter will use this data and show how well representation works in 
a weakly institutionalized party system.  
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APPENDIX 2.1: CAP Coding Guidelines 
 
Coding Guidelines of the CAP 
 
1. Observations are coded according to the single predominant, substantive policy area 
rather than the targets of particular policies or the policy instrument utilized. 
a) For example, if a case discusses mental health programs for returning veterans 
it would be coded according to the predominant substantive policy area (mental 
illness, code 333) rather than the target of the programs (veterans affairs, code 
1609).  If a case discusses changes to the home mortgage tax deduction, it is 
coded according to the substantive policy area (consumer mortgages, code 1504) 
rather than the policy instrument (the tax code, code 107). 
2. Observations that discuss appropriations for particular departments and agencies are 
coded according to their substantive policy area.  Those that discuss appropriations for 
multiple departments and agencies that span multiple major topic codes are coded as 
general government operations (code 2000). 
a) For example, cases that discuss appropriations for the Department of Energy 
are coded as energy (code 800) and those that discuss appropriations for the FAA 
are coded as air transportation (code 1003).  Cases that discuss appropriations 
across multiple major topic areas, such as appropriations for the Ministry of 
foreign affairs (code 1900), the Ministry of Defense (code 1600), and the Ministry 
of Energy (code 800), are coded as general government operations (code 2000). 
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3. The general (00) topic includes cases where more than one distinct subtopic was 
discussed within a single major topic area.  
a) For example, if a case discusses both water pollution (code 701) and air pollution 
(code 705), it is coded as a general environmental issue (code 700). Thus, the 
general category within each major topic area includes some cases that are truly 
general as well as some cases that are the combination of as few as two 
subtopics.  Each major topic includes another category (NN99) for issues that do not 
fit into any of the categories and for which there were too few cases to justify the 
creation of a new category.   
4. While it is uncommon that observations not related to appropriations equally span two 
major topic areas, these observations are assigned the numerically lower major or 
subtopic code. 
a)  For example, a case that discussed both drinking water safety (code 701) and 
hydroelectricity (code 802) with equal weight is coded according to the numerically 
lower code (code 701).  This is a rarely used, arbitrary guideline employed for cases 
that do not clearly have a distinguishable, predominate substantive issue focus. 
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APPENDIX 2.2: Tables  
 
Table II-1 Percentage of Votes of Islamist Parties in Parliamentary and General 
Local Elections (1973–2014) 
Year Party  Votes 
(%) 
1973 (parliamentary): National Salvation Party (MSP) 11.8 
1977 (parliamentary): MSP  8.6 
1984 (local): Welfare Party (RP) 4.4 
1987 (parliamentary): RP 7.2 
1989 (local): RP 9.8 
1991 (parliamentary): RP (in coalition with the MHP and IDP)*  16.9 
1994 (local): RP  19.1 
1995 (parliamentary): RP   21.4 
1999 (parliamentary): Virtue Party (FP)  15.4 
2002 (parliamentary) AKP  34.3 
2004 (local) AKP 41.67 
2007 (parliamentary) AKP 46.58 
2009 (local) AKP 38.39 
2011 (parliamentary) AKP 49.83 
2014 (local) AKP 43.39 
*MHP stands for the Nationalist Action Party and IDP for the Reformist Democracy 
Party. 
Source: Turkstat 
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Table II-2: Summary of the DALP Clientelism Questions 
Question Answer 
1. Consider whether candidates and parties give or 
promise to give citizens consumer goods (e.g., food or 
liquor, clothes, cookware, appliances, medicines, building 
materials etc.) as inducement to obtain their votes.  
How much effort do candidates and parties expend to 
attract voters by providing consumer goods?  
[1] A negligible effort or 
none at all 
[2] A minor effort 
[3] A moderate effort 
[4] A major effort 
*99+ Don’t know 
2. Consider whether candidates and parties give or 
promise to give citizens preferential access to material 
advantages in public social policy schemes (e.g., 
preferential access to subsidized prescription drugs, public 
scholarships, public housing, better police protection etc.) 
as inducement to obtain their votes.  
How much effort do candidates and parties expend to 
attract voters by providing preferential public benefits?  
[1] A negligible effort or 
none at all  
[2] A minor effort  
[3] A moderate effort  
[4] A major effort  
*99+ Don’t know  
3. Consider whether candidates or parties give or promise 
to give citizens preferential access to employment in the 
public sector or in the publicly regulated private sector 
(e.g., post office, janitorial services, maintenance work, 
jobs at various skill levels in state owned enterprises or in 
large private enterprises with government contracts and 
subsidies, etc.) as inducement to obtain their vote. 
How much effort do candidates or parties expend to attract 
voters by providing preferential access to employment 
opportunities?  
[1] A negligible effort or 
none at all  
[2] A minor effort  
[3] A moderate effort  
[4] A major effort  
*99+ Don’t know  
4. Consider whether candidates or parties give or promise 
to give citizens and businesses preferential access to 
government contracts or procurement opportunities (e.g., 
public works/construction projects, military procurement 
projects without competitive bidding to companies whose 
employees support the awarding party) as inducement to 
gain their and their employees’ votes.  
How much effort do candidates or parties expend to attract 
voters by offering them preferential access to government 
contracts or procurement opportunities?  
[1] A negligible effort or 
none at all  
[2] A minor effort  
[3] A moderate effort  
[4] A major effort  
*99+ Don’t know  
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Table II-2 Continued 
5. Consider whether candidates or parties influence or 
promise to influence the application of regulatory rules 
issued by government agencies (e.g., more lenient tax 
assessments and audits, more favorable interpretation of 
import and export regulation, less strict interpretation of 
fire and escape facilities in buildings, etc.) in order to 
favor individual citizens or specific businesses as 
inducement to gain their and their employees’ vote.  
How much effort do candidates or parties expend to 
attract voters and the businesses for which they work by 
influencing regulatory proceedings in their favor?  
[1] A negligible effort or 
none at all  
[2] A minor effort  
[3] A moderate effort  
[4] A major effort  
*99+ Don’t know  
Source: DALP Codebook 
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Chapter 3: The Effect of Public Opinion on Policymaking  
 
 
In the previous chapters I described how weak party institutionalization and 
clientelism might impact the relationship between public opinion and policymaking 
activities. The literature suggests that since in these systems parties tend to rely on 
clientelistic linkage mechanisms and offer club goods by targeting small sets of 
constituencies, parties are less concerned with the general public opinion.  
 Chapter Two introduced Turkey as a case of weak party institutionalization with 
highly clientelistic parties and discussed the data. In this chapter, I will focus on the 
following questions: 
1. Are the priorities of the public transmitted to the policy agenda? 
2. Does the level of responsiveness vary according to the policy channel in 
question? 
3. Does the level of responsiveness increase during election times? 
In order to answer these questions, three analyses will be conducted. The first 
analysis will focus on the laws that passed in the Turkish parliament between 2002 and 
2013. The second analysis will focus on parliamentary bills for the same period and the 
last analysis will examine oral questions. This research strategy not only allows us to 
study representation from a broader angle, but also enables us to see the effect of 
institutions on policy responsiveness.  
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For the purpose of these analyses, I have created a unique dataset that consists of 
all the laws that were passed during these 11 years, and all parliamentary bills and oral 
questions submitted to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) as well as the 
most important problem question of the Eurobarometer survey. During this period the 
AKP ruled the country with single party majority governments. Therefore, the choice of 
time period ensures that all the changes in the dependent variable are due to the public 
opinion and not a change in the government. Before explaining the statistical model and 
the variables, I will first show the general trends in the public and political agenda and 
uncover the similarities or differences between the two agendas. 
 
The Public and the Policymaking Agenda 
A common finding in the literature regarding public priorities is the dominance of 
a few issues on the public agenda (Green 2007; Chaques-Bonafont and Palau 2011). This 
is especially the case for the developing countries since the public priorities have not 
transitioned from materialist values such as economic and physical security to a new set 
of post-materialist values emphasizing more autonomy and self-expression (Inglehart 
2008). In this respect, few issues seem to capture the attention of the Turkish public. 
Figure 1 shows the percentages of the five most important problems in the public agenda. 
The economy is by far the most important problem according to the public. It is followed 
by terrorism, crime, education, and health. Together these five issues form 90.76% of the 
public agenda for the decade under question. As a whole, economic issues capture 56.54 
percent of the public agenda, defense/terrorism 22.51 percent, crime 5.10, education 3.98, 
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and health 2.62. These percentages are hardly surprising in the context of a developing 
country. In transitional countries, issues such as environment, immigration or individual 
rights usually form a small percentage of the public agenda as these issues are usually of 
secondary importance. 
 
Figure 3.1: Most Salient Issues on the Public Agenda (2002-2013) 
 
During the period under study, the Turkish economy did well compared to the 
pre-2002 period during which the country experienced deep economic crises. Although 
there had been an improvement in terms of the inflation rate, unemployment remained as 
a major problem for the Turkish economy. The second most important problem on the 
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public agenda is defense. Turkey’s long struggle with PKK8 terror has always been an 
important concern for the public as the problem not only threatened the security of the 
country, but also had a major impact on the economy. The trend in the public opinion 
largely follows the escalation or decline in the terrorist activities. It increases from 2007 
to 2008 and 2011 to 2013 when the PKK escalated violence, and it decreases between 
2009 and 2011 during peace negotiations.  
 
The Government Agenda: Laws 
Figure 3.2 shows the average percentage of attention given to each topic for laws. 
Foreign affairs makes up 18% of the laws passed during the period under study. This is 
due to the fact that the Turkish Constitution requires every agreement (whether 
international or bilateral) to be confirmed by the Parliament. If we exclude foreign 
affairs, economy seems to receive the most attention in terms of laws, followed by justice 
and crime, defense and transportation. These topics are quite compatible with the salient 
issues on the public agenda. Four of the topics on which the Turkish government 
legislated the most are also among the five most important problems according to the 
public opinion. 
 
  
                                                          
8 PKK is a terrorist organization whose ideology is based on Kurdish nationalism and separatism. 
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Figure 3.2: The Distribution of Laws in Each Issue Area (2002-2013) 
 
 
Parliamentary Bills 
As mentioned earlier, the AKP has ruled the country since 2002 with single party 
majority governments. This enabled the government to dominate the legislative agenda 
and pass any legislation they desired. Therefore, analyzing only laws does not tell us 
much about the priorities of the opposition and their responsiveness to the public 
priorities.  In order to examine the opinion-policy responsiveness from a broader angle 
we also analyze the parliamentary bills. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the bills 
drafted in the TGNA by topic.  
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Figure 3.3: The Distribution of Parliamentary Bills in Each Issue Area (2002-2013) 
 
Government affairs is the most salient issue in the legislator’s agenda. This 
finding is not surprising as topic covers a variety of constituency related issues.9 After 
government affairs, education is the most popular topic followed by justice and crime, 
economy, and defense. Again, the distribution of topics seem to be compatible with the 
public priorities as four of the most popular topics in terms of bill initiation are those that 
are prioritized by the public.  
 
  
                                                          
9 See Table 2.5 for examples  
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Oral Questions 
 Lastly, Figure 4 shows the distribution of attention for oral questions. Again 
government affairs is the most salient issue for the Turkish legislators followed by 
transportation, agriculture, economy, and health. Two of these issues, economy and 
health, are also among the five most salient issues for the public. This trend implies that 
as we move from laws to parliamentary bills and questions, the congruence between 
priorities tend to decrease. 
 
Figure 3.4: The Distribution of Oral Questions in Each Issue Area (2002-2013) 
 
The above figures visualize the overall distribution of attention across different 
policymaking channels. In order to see how and to what direction these trends move over 
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time, I also plotted the trends in different policymaking channels against the trends in 
public opinion. Although comparing the average percentages of attention in each policy 
area is useful, we need a better indicator that will show how similar the distribution of the 
policymaker’s attention is to the distribution of public’s attention. To this end, I have 
calculated the mean absolute deviation (MAD) of the five most salient issues on the 
public agenda for all policymaking channels. The results are presented in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1: Mean Absolute Difference of the Policymaking Activities and Public 
Opinion 
 
Laws Bills Oral Questions 
Economy 47.50 52.04 49.90 
Defense and Terrorism 13.87 15.49 19.93 
Justice and Crime 4.74 6.63 1.82 
Education 3.42 8.58 5.63 
Health 2.70 2.78 5.59 
 
Generally, there seems to be a better congruence between laws and public 
opinion. For example, the MAD for laws under the economy category is 47.50, whereas it 
is 52.04 and 49.90 for bills and oral questions respectively. Similarly for defense and 
terrorism the MAD is smallest in the domain of laws (13.87) and largest in the domain of 
oral question (19.93).   
Figure 3.5 plots public opinion versus laws for the five most important problems 
in order to compare the general trend in terms of public versus legislative priorities. The 
straight line represents the MAD between laws and public opinion for the five topics. 
Although there seems to be a gap between the public priorities and laws for the topic of 
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economy, there is a directional correspondence. However, the MAD is quite high. The 
percentage of laws under this topic gets closer to the MAD around 2008 and 2009. This is 
most likely due to the effect of the 2008 financial crisis. The lawmaking agenda seems to 
be particularly responsive in the domain of defense and terrorism. As mentioned earlier, 
PKK violence escalated in 2007 and the issue of terrorism became highly salient in the 
public agenda. The government seems to respond to the public priority by legislating 
more on this topic in the following year.  
 
Figure 3.5: Public Priorities versus Laws (2002-2013) 
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Figure 3.6 plots public opinion versus parliamentary bills. For all categories the 
MAD is higher compared to the laws. The MAD is the highest for the category of 
economy. For defense and terrorism and justice and crime topics, there seems to be a 
better congruence. 
 
Figure 3.6: Public Priorities versus Parliamentary Bills (2002-2013) 
 
Lastly, Figure 3.7 plots oral questions against public priorities. Compared to laws 
and bills, there is a weaker correspondence. Similar to laws and bills, the MAD is highest 
for the topic of economy. The directional correspondence is also weaker compared to the 
other policy-making channels.  
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Figure 3.7: Public Priorities versus Oral Questions (2002-2013) 
 
To sum up, the visual presentation of the data provides some hints in terms of 
how well representation works for different policy-making channels. In general, the 
congruence between public opinion and policy-making activities seem to worsen as we 
move from laws to oral questions. However, one needs more analysis to properly assess 
the relationship between public opinion and policy-making.  
 
The Statistical Model 
To test the effect of public opinion on policy activities, we use time series 
autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) models that account for the autoregressive nature of 
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the laws, bills, and questions of the Turkish Parliament.10 This modelling strategy is 
preferred to a separate analysis of each issue area because our data do not have enough 
observations for issue specific time series analysis. The unit of analysis in our model is 
the policy topic parliamentary year, where each year is the time value and each major 
topic is treated as an individual panel. This resulted in a total N of 231 (11 years * 21 
major topics) observations. The models used to test the relationship between public 
opinion and various policymaking channels take the following form: 
 
LAWSit = α0 + β1 PUBLICit-1 + β2LAWS it-1 + β3 MISERY + β4 ELECTION YEAR + Ɛit 
 
BILLSit = α0 + β1PUBLIC it-1+ β2BILLS it-1 + β3 MISERY + β4 ELECTION YEAR + Ɛit 
 
QUESTIONSit = α0 + β1PUBLICit-1+ β2QUESTIONS it-1 + β3 MISERY + β4 ELECTION 
YEAR + Ɛit 
 
Dependent Variable 
To measure the effect of public opinion on various policy channels, we use three 
dependent variables. In the first model, the dependent variable is the laws passed by the 
Turkish Parliament. For example, the percentage of laws on education in year 2004 in the 
data set is one observation, as is the percentage of laws on education in 2005, and so is 
the percentage of laws on healthcare in the 2005, and so forth. 
                                                          
10 In order to get reliable results from an ADL model we need to make sure that the data are stationary. I 
have conducted a Levin-Lin-Chu unit root test which confirmed that the data are stationary. 
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 In the second model, the dependent variable is the bills by policy year. The 
proportion of bills on the topic of defense and terrorism in 2003 is one observation, as is 
the proportion of bills on the topic of economy in 2004. The last model uses the oral 
questions as the dependent variable using the same method. 
 
Independent Variables 
The main explanatory variable in the model is lagged public opinion. The public 
opinion variable is measured by the most important problem question of the 
Eurobarometer surveys. To create the variable, I first coded each answer according to the 
CAP main topics, and for each poll, I calculated the percentages of every issue category. 
Finally, I aggregated the data annually by taking average values in those years where 
multiple polls were conducted. A statistically positive coefficient for the lagged public 
opinion variable means that previous attention to an issue by the public increases the 
attention to the issue in the legislature in the form of laws, parliamentary bills, and oral 
questions on the same topic.  
I also included a lagged version of the dependent variable in each of the models 
since there is a strong reason to believe that laws, bills, and questions follow an auto 
regressive process. In other words, one of the best possible predictors for the number of 
laws/bills/questions on the issue of education in a given year is the number of 
laws/bills/questions on education in the previous year. Since during the period under 
study AKP was always in government and the composition of the parties in the 
parliament was somewhat stable, we expect this autoregressive progress to be quite 
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strong.   
 
Control Variables 
 Elections might have an impact on the level of policy responsiveness. The 
parliamentary session before the election is an important period when political actors 
seek ways to maximize their votes and re-gain office. Hence, political parties are more 
likely to give special attention to those issues that are highly salient to the public right 
before the elections in order to increase their chances of re-election (Jones 1994; 
Maravall 1999; Klingemann et al. 2006). Similarly,  policymakers will tend to give 
special attention to public priorities during the parliamentary session right after elections 
since the effect of the campaign will be more prevalent, and both the public and the 
political parties will be more attentive to the political agenda (Sulkin 2009).  To sum up, 
the level of correspondence between the policymakers and the public might increase 
during election periods. To control for the effect of the elections on policy 
responsiveness, we include a dummy variable which takes the value of one for election 
years and zero otherwise 
Contextual information about the country is also included using the misery index. 
The index was created by economist Arthur Okun. It is an economic indicator which is 
calculated by adding the unemployment rate to the inflation rate assuming that the 
combination a higher rate of unemployment and a worsening of inflation creates 
economic and social costs for a country. This variable is included in the model since the 
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ability of the governments to follow the priorities of the public might be hampered by 
deteriorating economic conditions (Duch and Stevenson 2010). 
Table 3.1 shows the results of our first model where the dependent variable is the 
laws. The coefficient of the lagged public opinion variable is quite small and insignificant 
for Model I indicating that public priorities have no effect on law making. Results are 
similar for the parliamentary bills and the oral questions. The only variable that is 
consistently significant across all three models is the lagged values of the dependent 
variables. This shows that the legislative agenda is relatively stable, and issues that were 
on the legislative agenda in the previous year are more likely to make it to the next year’s 
agenda.  
The election year coefficient is positive across all three models, but it is 
statistically insignificant. This finding contradicts with the findings of the previous 
literature that argue that policymakers become more responsive during election times 
(Chaques-Bonafont and Palau 2011). The misery variable is also statistically 
insignificant. This finding is hardly surprising as during the period under study, the 
inflation and unemployment rates were relatively stable.  
 
 
  
82 
 
Table 3.2: Time-series Cross-sectional Model of Opinion-Policy Responsiveness 
2002-2013 
 Model I 
Laws 
Model II 
Bills 
Model III 
Questions 
Publict-1 0.00 0.01 -0.03 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) 
Lawst-1 0.45*** - - 
 (0.12)   
Billst-1 - 0.78*** - 
  (0.05)  
Questionst-1 - - 0.52*** 
   (0.12) 
Election Year 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Misery -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 2.48*** 0.97*** 2.26*** 
 (0.48) (0.24) (0.50) 
    
R-squared 0.31 0.78 0.35 
N 242 242 242 
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses 
                             *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In general, these results seem to confirm the expectation in the literature regarding 
weak party institutionalization and clientelism as the policymakers seem to be 
unresponsive to the priorities of the public. However, a closer look to the data reveals the 
fact that this result largely stems from the way the economy category was coded in the 
most important problem dataset. As presented in Figure 3.1, on average more that 50 
percent of the public thinks that economy is the most important problem facing the 
country. This category is created by combining three separate categories: economy, 
prices/inflation, and unemployment.  Therefore, it makes up more than half of the MIP 
answers. Although economy seems to be the biggest concern of the public, there are 
limited legislative activities that can be done about it. In Turkey, the Central Bank is 
independent, and it determines the inflation policy. Similarly, there is a limit to what 
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governments can legislate about unemployment. Previous research also refers to the 
governments’ limited ability to manage the economy (see for example Alesina and 
Rosenthal 1994; Duch and Stevenson 2010; Greene et al. 2014).  
In order to see the relationship between opinion and policy without the economy 
category, we drop it from the analysis. We also drop the misery index variable since its 
inclusion is not intuitive without the economy category. Table 3.2 repeats the same 
analyses by excluding the economy category. The results largely confirm our 
expectations. The coefficient for the lagged public opinion in the first model becomes 
significant and larger. Figure 3.8 shows this effect graphically by calculating the marginal 
effects.11 
Lagged public opinion variable becomes larger for the second model where the 
dependent variable is the bills, but it is still insignificant. For the oral questions, the 
coefficient remains negative and insignificant. The election year variable also remains 
insignificant across all three models.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
11 As Cameron & Trivedi note (2005: 333), “A marginal effect or partial effect, most often measures the 
effect on the conditional mean of y of a change in one of the regressors, say Xk. In the linear regression 
model, the ME equals the relevant slope coefficient, greatly simplifying analysis”.  
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Table 3.3: Time-series Cross-sectional Model of Opinion-Policy Responsiveness 
(economy category excluded), 2002-2013 
 Model I 
Laws 
Model II 
Bills 
Model III 
Questions 
Publict-1 0.13** 0.06 -0.04 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) 
Lawst-1 0.53*** - - 
 (0.13)   
Billst-1 - 0.78*** - 
  (0.05)  
Questionst-1 - - 0.63*** 
   (0.12) 
Election Year 0.15 0.06 0.09 
 (0.27) (0.01) (0.22) 
Constant 1.94*** 0.88*** 1.82*** 
 (0.48) (0.23) (0.54) 
    
R-squared 0.36 0.78 0.42 
N 231 231 231 
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Figure 3.8: The Marginal Effect of Public Opinion on Laws  
 
Note: Shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals 
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 The Role of Institutions 
Institutions play a crucial role in the political process. To explain the mechanism 
between institutional structure and political responsiveness, Jones and Baumgartner 
(2005) and Jones et al. (2009) developed the concept of “institutional friction”. This 
concept refers to formal institutional structures that introduce decision and transaction 
costs associated with a particular policy venue and the number of individuals and 
collective actors whose agreement is required for decision-making. According to this 
framework, as a proposal moves from the agenda setting stage to the decision making 
stage, institutional friction will increase, and policy responsiveness will decrease since 
the capacity of the policy makers to respond to public’s demands will be lower (Jones 
et.al 2009).  
Based on this framework, oral questions should have been the most responsive 
policymaking channel as transaction costs for asking a question is the lowest. Similarly, 
laws should have been the least responsive policymaking channel. According to the 
results of the analyses, laws are the most responsive policymaking channel, and oral 
questions are the least. In terms of the relationship between opinion responsiveness and 
policymaking channel, our results do not corroborate the findings of the previous 
literature (Jones et al. 2009; Chaques-Bonafont and Palau 2011). These findings might 
stem from the fact oral questions and bill initiation are widely used for constituency 
service, confirming the findings of the previous literature (Martin 2011). 
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Summary 
In this chapter, I have focused on the relationship between public opinion and 
policymaking activities across different policymaking channels. The results show that the 
Turkish government is responsive to the priorities of the public, and it takes into account 
the public opinion while legislating. This finding is quite intuitive as since 2002, Turkey 
has been ruled by a single party with a strong parliamentary majority. Without having to 
deal with complex coalition bargaining and accommodating rival political parties’ policy 
demands, the AKP government had a distinct advantage in its ability to follow public 
priorities. This finding is important since law-making is probably the most important 
policymaking channel.  
For parliamentary bills and oral questions, public opinion seems to have no 
significant impact. This finding is not totally surprising considering that oral questions 
and parliamentary bills are also widely used for the purposes of constituency service. In 
this respect, parties seem to be using different policymaking channels for different 
purposes as laws are more responsive to public priorities, and bills and oral questions 
seem to be more frequently used for clientelistic purposes. 
These first results indicate that highly clientelistic parties in weakly 
institutionalized party systems can indeed be responsive to the priorities of the general 
public. Since law-making is dominated by the governing AKP, these results imply that 
AKP is more responsive to the public priorities compared to the other parties in the 
parliament. This finding is compatible with the current literature which argues that parties 
vary in their level of responsiveness. Klüver and Spoon (forthcoming), for example, show 
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that larger parties are more responsive to the issues prioritized by the public. However, 
their findings also suggest that governing parties are less responsive to voter priorities 
which reflect the constraints governing parties have to face.  
In order to be able to see the variation between parties, more analyses are 
required. The next chapter is dedicated to this task. In the following chapter, I will 
disaggregate the parliamentary bills at the party level and conduct the same analyses. By 
focusing on the party level responsiveness, the chapter will enable us to see the variations 
among parties both in terms of responsiveness to the public opinion and their issue 
priorities. 
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Chapter 4: Responsiveness of the Parties to the Priorities of the Public 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I investigated the relationship between public opinion and 
policymaking and examined the correspondence between public and legislative priorities 
in several policymaking channels. In this chapter, I turn my attention to the 
correspondence at the party level to see the variation in terms of responsiveness to public 
priorities. In this respect, I specifically focus on the following questions:  
1. Is there variation at the party level in terms of responsiveness to the public 
priorities? 
2.  Are some parties more focused on certain issues than the others? 
The extant literature on opinion and policy responsiveness (e.g. Adams et al. 
2006; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; Ezrow et al. 2011) argues that larger parties, 
mainstream parties, and governing parties will be more responsive to the median voter. In 
this context, there might be differences in responsiveness between the four parties that 
represent a significant variation in terms of their size and ideology. In order to analyze 
the opinion policy linkage at the party level, I focus on the parliamentary bills of each 
party that managed to secure seats in the parliament for the period under study.  
The second chapter provided detailed information about the governing AKP and 
the main opposition CHP. However, after 2007, two other parties had managed to enter 
the parliament: the Turkish right wing nationalist MHP and the Kurdish left wing 
89 
 
nationalist BDP. Hence, I will first briefly explain the foundation and the ideology of 
these two parties. 
 
Far Right and Far Left in Turkey 
The MHP was formed when the former junta member and nationalist politician 
Alparslan Türkeş gained the control of the conservative rural Republican Villagers 
Nation Party (CKMP). In 1969, the party was renamed as the Nationalist Movement 
Party.  
After the 1980 coup, the party was banned along with all other political parties 
and many of its members were imprisoned. In 1985, the party was reformed as the 
Conservative Party and later the Nationalist Task Party. Finally, in 1992, it returned to its 
original name. In the 1999 elections, MHP entered the parliament as the second largest 
party and became a coalition member. However, in 2002, it failed to pass the 10 percent 
electoral threshold and could not enter the parliament. In 2007, the party secured around 
14 percent of the votes and gained 71 seats. Finally, in the 2011 elections, the party 
received 13 percent of the votes and won 53 seats, retaining its status as the third largest 
group in the Parliament. In general, MHP is known for its focus on nationalism and tough 
stance on the fight against terrorism and crime. 
BDP, on the other hand, has a leftist ideology and is more concerned with the 
rights of the Kurdish citizens. It also has close ties with the terrorist group PKK. The 
party’s roots go back to 1990 when the first Kurdish party HEP was founded. As 
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mentioned in Chapter 2, the Kurdish political parties have been frequently banned by the 
Constitutional Court and reformed after each ban under a new name. From HEP to the 
current BDP, seven Kurdish nationalist parties were banned by the Court due to the close 
ties with the PKK. In order to clear the 10 percent electoral threshold, the party adopted a 
different strategy which is based on supporting independent candidates. Thanks to its 
strong network among the Kurdish public, the party managed to secure 20 seats after the 
2007 elections and even increased its support in 2011 by gaining 36 seats in the 
parliament. 
According to the expert survey analysis conducted by Benoit and Laver (2006), 
BDP and MHP are located at the opposite ends of the ideological left-right spectrum.12All 
together these four parties present a suitable sample to test the variation in terms of 
responsiveness. However, before embarking the statistical analysis, I will first focus on 
the distribution of bill topics for each party and try to visualize the patterns in terms of 
attention allocation. 
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of the AKP bills. Government affairs is by far 
the most salient issue on the AKP members’ agenda followed by education, justice and 
crime, commerce, and economy. The party agenda seems to be somewhat parallel to the 
public agenda as three of the five most important problems are also prioritized in the 
party members’ bills.  
 
 
 
                                                          
12 On a 20 point scale, BDP has a score of 5.2, whereas MHP has a score of 18.4. 
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Figure 4.1: The Distribution of AKP Bills in Each Issue Area (2002-2013) 
 
 
The pattern is also observed in the CHP bills (Figure 4.2). Government affairs is 
the most salient topic followed by justice and crime, education, economy, and defense. In 
other words, four of the five most salient issues in the public agenda made it to the CHP’s 
legislative agenda. An interesting point is the high proportion of bills drafted under the 
justice and crime topic. Roughly 16 percent of the CHP bills were related to justice and 
crime. The strong focus on justice and crime by a center left party is unusual in the 
Western context. However, since the party was always in the opposition, it is plausible to 
expect CHP members to draft bills addressing the problems related to justice and crime 
issues and force the government to act on the issue. 
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Figure 4.2: The Distribution of CHP Bills in Each Issue Area (2002-2013) 
 
 
The above results do not present a stark difference between center right AKP and 
center left CHP. Now, I turn my attention to the other parties in order to see whether the 
distribution of attention differs for left wing BDP and right wing MHP. Figure 4.3 and 
4.4 present the topic distribution for MHP and BDP bills respectively. 
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Figure 4.3: The Distribution of MHP Bills in Each Issue Area (2002-2013) 
 
 
Government affairs makes up almost one third of the total MHP bills followed by 
education, defense, social policy, and justice and crime. Surprisingly, the right wing 
MHP drafted more bills under the topic of social policy than the center left CHP. This 
finding lends some support to Aydogan and Slapin (forthcoming) who argue that left-
right politics in Turkey is reversed.  
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Figure 4.4: The Distribution of BDP Bills in Each Issue Area (2002-2013) 
 
 
The distribution of the topics for the BDP bills largely confirms its status as a 
niche party. Justice and crime is the most salient issue in the party agenda, followed by 
government affairs, civil rights, education, and defense. The reason for the large amount 
of bills in the field of justice and crime is the party’s close ties with the PKK. Due to 
these relations, many party members were accused of supporting the PKK and organizing 
its urban resistance forces.  
In addition, Turkish prisons have a large number of terrorists captured by the 
military and police forces. In this regard, legislators of the party drafted many bills 
proposing better prison conditions and changes to the criminal code. There is also strong 
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focus on the topic of civil rights due to the issues related to the rights of the Kurdish 
citizens such as education in mother tongue, freedom of assembly.  
In sum, these results imply that the governing AKP and main opposition CHP and 
to some degree the right wing MHP show similar trends in terms of the distribution of 
attention. BDP, on the other hand, seems to be quite focussed on its own narrow 
constituency and ignore the issues that are salient to the mass public. So far, I have 
focussed on the distribution of the bill topics by party. Below, I turn my focus to the 
congruence between the public and party priorities. As in the previous chapter, I first 
present the mean absolute difference of each party’s policy activities for the five most 
salient issues on the public agenda. Table 4.1 presents the results. 
 
Table 4.1: Mean Absolute Difference of the Party Bills and Public Opinion 
  
AKP 
Bills 
CHP 
Bills 
MHP 
Bills 
BDP 
Bills 
Economy 51.50 50.90 43.75 51.30 
Defense and Terrorism 16.01 16.27 16.55 23.85 
Justice and Crime 5.60 8.98 3.45 28.46 
Education 9.38 7.04 11.65 10.80 
Health 5.41 3.12 2.30 3.25 
 
Several patterns are striking. First, for the topic of economy, the MAD is smaller 
for MHP bills (43.75)  compared to other parties. Second, the Kurdish nationalist BDP 
prioritizes justice and crime over other issues. The MAD for the party bills on this topic 
is 23.85 which means that there is a gap between public and party priorities in this 
domain. 
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In order to see the general congruence between party bills and public opinion over 
time, I plot the two against each other. Figure 4.5 shows the correspondence between 
public opinion and AKP bills for the five most important problems over time. As in the 
previous graphs, the straight line shows the MAD between public opinion and party bills.   
 For economy, justice and defense, and terrorism AKP bills seem to be responding 
to the changes in the public opinion. For example, as the issue of economy becomes more 
salient around 2009 (probably due to the 2008 financial crisis), AKP members respond by 
drafting more bills under this topic. The percentage of party bills under the topic of 
economy comes closer to the MAD around 2009. Similarly, there seems to be a 
directional correspondence between public opinion and AKP bills for defense and 
terrorism and the percentage of party bills under this topic gets closer to the MAD after 
2009. For other issues, public opinion seems to be quite stable over time and the 
proportion of party bills are somewhat close to the public opinion.  
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Figure 4.5: Public Priorities versus AKP Bills (2002-2013) 
 
 
Figure 4.6 plots public priorities versus CHP bills. Similar patterns are observed: 
For the topic of economy, the party seems to respond to the public opinion better around 
2009. For, defense and terrorism the pattern is similar as well. There is a better 
congruence between the party bills and public priorities after 2009. 
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Figure 4.6: Public Priorities versus CHP Bills (2002-2013) 
 
 
Figure 4.7 shows the correspondence between public opinion and MHP bills. 
Party bills start around 2007 since MHP entered the parliament after the 2007 elections. 
There is an evident correspondence between public priorities and MHP bills for the topic 
of defense and terrorism. This is hardly a surprising finding considering the nationalist 
stance of MHP. 
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Figure 4.7: Public Priorities versus MHP Bills (2002-2013) 
 
  
Lastly, Figure 4.8 presents the results for the BDP. Similar to MHP, the BDP 
entered the parliament after the 2007 elections. The party seems to unresponsive to the 
general public opinion as party members drafted few bills under the topic of economy. 
There is a better congruence on the issue of defense and terrorism as the party bills under 
this topic seems to follow the same direction with the public tendency. For the issue of 
justice and crime, the party is quite far away from the public opinion. 
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Figure 4.8: Public Priorities versus BDP Bills (2002-2013) 
 
 
Overall, the visual evidence provides some hints about the extent of policy 
responsiveness for each party. However, a detailed analysis is needed to reveal the 
differences at the party level. In this respect, I use a time series ADL model where the 
dependent variable is the bills drafted by each party in the Turkish Parliament, 
specifically party bills by policy topic, year, and the independent variables are lagged 
public opinion and lagged party bills.  
This choice of analysis led to four models; one for each party. The models used to 
test the relationship between public opinion and party bills take the following form: 
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PARTY BILLS it = α0 + β1PUBLICit-1+ β2PARTY BILLSit-1 + Ɛit 
 
The results are presented in Table 4.1. Similar to the aggregate level model for the 
bills, the public opinion variable is insignificant across all models. Even the sign of the 
coefficient is negative. The only variable that is significant across all models is the lagged 
party bill variable. The coefficient for the variable is highly significant and positive 
which means that the distribution of the topics is quite consistent across years. For 
example, Model II shows that 71 percent of the CHP bills drafted in year t were on the 
same topic with those bills drafted in year t-1. 
 
Table 4.2: Time Series Cross Sectional Model of Party Agendas  
 Model I 
AKP Bills 
Model II 
CHP Bills 
Model III 
MHP Bills 
Model IV 
BDP Bills 
Publict-1 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.19 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.18) 
Party Billst-1 0.59*** 0.71*** 0.54*** 0.30 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.21) (0.191) 
Constant 2.99*** 1.81*** 3.99** 10.32*** 
 (0.72) (0.62) (1.82) (3.00) 
     
R-squared 0.51 0.58 0.34 0.16 
N 126 155 60 32 
             Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses 
              *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As in the previous chapter, I have also repeated the same analysis after dropping 
the economy category. The results (Table 4.2) have not shown any substantive change. 
The coefficient for the public opinion variable becomes positive for MHP and CHP, but it 
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fails to reach statistical significance. For AKP and BDP, the coefficient remains negative 
and insignificant.  
 
Table 4.3: Time Series Cross Sectional Model of Party Agendas (economy excluded) 
 Model I 
AKP Bills 
Model II 
CHP Bills 
Model III 
MHP Bills 
Model IV 
BDP Bills 
Publict-1 -0.00 0.00 0.10 -0.19 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) (0.18) 
Party Billst-1 0.61*** 0.73*** 0.55*** 0.30 
 (0.09) (0.078) (0.21) (0.19) 
Constant 2.87*** 1.65*** 3.68** 10.32*** 
 (0.72) (0.59) (1.77) (3.01) 
     
R-squared 0.53 0.62 0.35 0.16 
N 116 144 54 32 
             Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses 
              *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
The above results show that there is no significant variation between party bills in 
terms of responsiveness to the public priorities. However, parties might be more 
responsive to the priorities of “their voters” instead of the general public. As Ezrow 
(2010) contends, “niche parties,” which usually specialize in few issues, are more likely 
to respond to their mean or median party supporter rather than to the median voter. This 
might especially be the case for the far right MHP and far left BDP. In this regard, a 
better test should include measures of the party supporters’ priorities and analyze the 
congruence between the priorities of the “party supporters” and the party’s policy 
activities. Unfortunately, the Eurobarometer surveys used in this study stopped asking the 
party identification and vote intention questions after 2005 which prevented me to 
conduct this type of analysis. 
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Summary 
In this chapter, I have examined the opinion policy-linkage at the party level. 
Previous chapter has shown that policymakers are not responsive to the public priorities 
when they are drafting bills. In this section, I have disaggregated the parliamentary bill 
data and investigated the opinion-policy linkage at the party level.   The results do not 
show any variation in terms of party responsiveness, and all four parties seem to be 
equally unresponsive to public opinion when they are drafting bills.  
However, the distribution of topics for each party indicates the emergence of issue 
ownership at least for some parties. For example, only 1.6% of the BDP bills were 
devoted to the topic of economy, whereas 26% of the BDP bills were under the justice 
and crime topic.  Similarly, the issue of civil rights seems to be more salient for the left-
wing Kurdish BDP than any other party which actually confirms the niche party status of 
the BDP.  
The results of this chapter do not offer any evidence to support the findings of the 
previous literature which argue that parties vary in their degree of responsiveness to the 
public opinion. However, as mentioned earlier, this dissertation argues that the political 
agenda is jointly structured by public priorities and party preferences. In order to be able 
to fully uncover the dynamics of representation and responsiveness, the long term 
preferences of the political parties should also be taken into account. The following 
chapter does that by including party preferences into the analysis and offers a new model 
that explains policy responsiveness as the joint function of public priorities and party 
mandate.  
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Chapter 5: The Responsiveness of Parties to their Party Platforms and Public 
Priorities. 
 
 
In the previous chapters, I have examined the congruence between public 
priorities and policymaking. Another strand of the literature on representation examines 
the congruence between the party platforms and subsequent policy activities which is 
called the program to policy nexus (Royed 1996; 1999; Thomson 2001; 2008). This 
dissertation argues that political parties are also bound by their long term policy 
commitments. In this respect, parties have to respond both to the public priorities and to 
their election platform.  
Clearly, party platforms are also expected to respond to the priorities of the 
public. However, they must also maintain a balance between their long term 
commitments/ideology and the public mood. To illustrate, let’s assume that there is a 
severe economic crisis in a European country, and the public identifies the generous 
social spending as the main cause of the crisis. The Social Democratic Party in the 
country is expected to adjust according to the public mood and propose some restrictions 
on social spending. However, the party cannot completely abandon its social democratic 
stance and support a smaller government since the core voter base might the discontent 
with such a change. Therefore, the party will eventually find a balance by both 
responding to the current public mood and still taking into account its party platform.  
So far, studies of representation have usually focused on only one aspect of 
representation mentioned above. This dissertation has identified this weakness and 
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argued that the political agenda is jointly structured by public priorities and party 
preferences. In order to be able to measure the true extent of policy responsiveness, a 
broader approach that takes into account these two mechanisms is needed. In this chapter, 
I take on this task and use a research strategy that combines these two approaches.  
The extant literature has argued that programmatic party systems create better 
representational ties and, in these systems, parties are more likely to compete based on 
distinct policy proposals (Mainwaring 1999; Mainwaring and Torcal 2005). On the other 
hand, scholars have also argued that the clientelistic linkage mechanisms employed by 
parties insulate the policymakers from the policy priorities of their constituents since non-
policy, selective benefits are substituted for the collective, policy-based benefits (Epstein 
2009). Hence, parties that employ clientelistic linkage mechanisms, as Turkish parties are 
said to do, are less responsive to the public preferences and party mandates (Kitschelt et 
al. 2010). In this respect, this chapter will also investigate whether clientelistic parties can 
develop and implement programmatic policy proposals. In sum, this chapter will focus on 
the following questions: 
 
1. Can clientelistic parties develop and implement programmatic policy 
proposals? 
2. Does the legislative agenda respond to the priorities of the public as well the 
party platforms? 
2. Can the opposition party exert any influence on the policymaking agenda? 
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3. Do the governing and opposition parties show variation in terms of their 
responsiveness to their electoral mandate and public opinion?  
 
Measuring Party Preferences 
According to the mandate theory, parties are the most important connection 
between the voters and policy, and the distribution of issues in manifestos is a good 
indicator of subsequent government actions (Klingeman et al. 1994). To measure the 
party preferences, we have coded the election manifestos of the governing party (AKP) as 
well as the main opposition party (CHP) according to the CAP topic coding system over 
three electoral cycles. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this is the traditional method used by 
CAP scholars, as well as others, to measure party priorities. In this dissertation, I offer a 
novel method to measure party priorities which I believe is superior to the classic 
method.   
So far, widely used datasets13 as well as most studies in the literature have used 
the proportion of manifesto sentences (or quasi sentences) to measure party preferences. I 
contend that, although useful, this method cannot capture the true priorities of the 
political parties. Manifestoes are long and detailed documents and they serve to a variety 
of purposes. Other than communicating the position of the party to the voter, they also 
reflect the consensus of the party elites in terms of party policies. As the political agenda 
is quite large, parties have to respond to a wide range of issues in their manifestos. They 
have to cover the salient issues that are on the public agenda, answer the critics of their 
                                                          
13 For example: The Comparative Manifestos Project; The Comparative Agendas Project, The 
Euromanifestos Project. 
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opponents and make general statements about issues on the political agenda. Certain parts 
of the manifestos can even be considered as cheap talk.  
However, there are also issues that are important to the parties. These issues are 
usually the ones where the party has an advantage and feels strong about (i.e. welfare for 
Social Democrat parties, immigration for right wing parties). For these issues, parties 
propose tangible policy proposals and make election pledges. By doing so, parties 
actually prioritize certain topics over others.  I call these the “the core issues” as those are 
the issues to which parties attribute the most importance.  
From this perspective, parties begin the prioritization process before entering the 
parliament. When parties enter the parliament, they give priority to the “core issues” in 
any way they can. For government parties, this can be in the form of law making. 
Opposition parties, on the other hand, prioritize these issues when they draft a bill or ask 
questions.  
To illustrate the difference between manifesto mentions and pledges, Table 5.1 
presents sample sentences from the AKP and CHP manifestos. As the table presents, 
manifestos contain several sentences which vary in their degree of tangible policy 
proposals. Sentences that are considered election pledges usually provide clear and 
quantifiable goals, whereas other sentences are vague and do not present a programmatic 
content. For example, sentence 3 is clearly a general statement that underlines the 
importance of animal rights. However, it does not propose a clear tangible goal that can 
somehow be measured. Similarly, sentence number 5 is another statement that points out 
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to a general goal: to distribute resources fairly. Yet, the statement is too vague and too 
general.  
Another example is sentence 10 which is nothing more than a statement 
evaluating the state of the economy. A closer look to the manifesto sentences that are 
coded as pledges reveal the stark difference between pledges and other sentences. For 
example, sentence 8 promises to sustain the independence of the Turkish Central Bank. 
This is a pledge that can easily be identified, and the fulfilment of the pledge can be 
determined. Similarly, sentence 9 sets a quantifiable goal and promises to triple the 
government budget for research and development.  
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Table 5.1: Sample Manifesto Sentences   
No Party Sentence Topic  Pledge 
1 CHP Contemporary Turkey can only be achieved through 
gender equality. 
2 NO 
2 CHP Agriculture is not a burden on Turkey it is our strength.  4 NO 
3 CHP Respect to animal rights is a requirement of the 
contemporary society. 
4 NO 
4 CHP We will elevate labor and protect the rights of the 
laborers. 
5 NO 
5 CHP We will assure fair division of resources.  1 NO 
6 CHP There have been severe price raises in governmental 
services.  
1 NO 
7 CHP We will reduce the inflation rate to single digits. 1 YES 
8 CHP We will sustain the independence of the Central Bank. 1 YES 
9 CHP In four years, we will triple the budget allocated to 
R&D. 
1 YES 
10 AKP Turkey has been left behind many countries in terms of 
inflation, growth rate, and income equality 
1 NO 
11 AKP The agricultural sector is in desperate situation.  4 NO 
12 AKP We will initiate the “General Healthcare System” and 
government will pay for those who cannot pay their 
insurance fees. 
1 YES 
13 AKP The share of Turkish marine transportation will be 
increased from 30% to 50%, and projects will be 
supported in accordance with this goal.  
1 YES 
 
 
As mentioned above, the degree of certainty and the quantifiable nature of the 
pledges actually point out to a reality: parties have clear policy proposals on these issues, 
and they are ready to act when they assume office. In this respect, these issues are more 
likely to be prioritized over others as parties have “game plans” for these issues. In 
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addition, by making pledges, parties also make those issues more salient in the media and 
public agenda. Studies that treat these two types of manifesto sentences as equal cannot 
capture the difference in terms of policy content. In this regard, using this method, I give 
weight to the sentences that has a strong policy content. In order to measure the real 
effect of election manifestos on subsequent policy activities, I focus on the pledges in the 
party manifestos. To identify pledges, I follow the techniques described in Royed (1996) 
and Thomson (2001). Royed (1996, 79) defines electoral pledge as follows: 
“ …'real' pledges are defined as a commitment to carry out some action or 
produce some outcome, where an objective estimation can be made as to 
whether or not the action was indeed taken or the outcome produced. If a 
party seems to commit to some sort of change, and one could equally 
strongly argue that it was carried out, and that it was not, then the 'pledge' 
is considered too vague or value-laden to be considered a 'real' pledge. 
Instead, it is considered primarily a rhetorical statement.  
 
The process for isolating such real 'pledges' from other sentences was the 
following: first, every sentence in the platforms and manifestos which 
seemed to be making some sort of pledge was marked. Secondly, these 
initial choices were re-examined and coded according to the scheme below 
and final 'pledges' were thus chosen. A potential 'pledge' generally has two 
clauses: (1) a phrase indicating commitment/support: we will/we support/we 
oppose/we will work for, etc. (2) the action or policy for which commitment 
is indicated. The first clause can indicate either a 'firm' commitment (we 
will) or a 'soft' commitment ('we support', or 'softer' still, 'we must, we 
should').  
 
Based on this definition, vague sentences such as “we will help the needy” are not 
considered as a pledge, whereas “we will reduce the inflation rate to single digits” is 
considered a pledge14. Based on this definition, the coders first determined the election 
pledges and then coded those pledges to a single topic code. To compare the difference, 
                                                          
14 As an illustration, in 2002 election manifestos, a total of 402 pledges satisfied the above definition. The 
AKP made 262 pledges, whereas the CHP made 140 pledges. 
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we have also calculated the percentages for the whole manifestos by assigning each 
sentence to a single topic code.  
 
The Statistical Model 
 
To test the effect of public priorities and party mandate on policymaking, I use 
time series ADL models. The analysis is presented using all data including those years 
between elections with the government and opposition agendas’ measures being repeated 
in each year. The unit of analysis in the models is the policy topic, year, where each year 
is the time value, and each major topic is treated as an individual panel.  
 
To measure the effect of public opinion and electoral mandate on various 
policymaking channels, I use three dependent variables. In the first model, the dependent 
variable is the laws passed by the Turkish Parliament, specifically laws by policy topic, 
year; for the second model, bills by policy topic, year, and for the last model oral 
questions by policy topic, year. The models take the following form: 
 
LAWS it = α0 + β1PUBLICit-1+ β2LAWSit-1 + β3GOVERNING PARTY PLEDGES+ 
β4OPPOSITION PARTY PLEDGES +  Ɛit 
 
BILLS it = α0 + β1PUBLICit-1+ β2BILLS it-1 + β3GOVERNING PARTY PLEDGES+ 
β4OPPOSITION PARTY PLEDGES +  Ɛit 
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QUESTIONS it = α0 + β1PUBLICit-1+ β2QUESTIONS it-1 + β3GOVERNING PARTY 
PLEDGES+ β4OPPOSITION PARTY PLEDGES +  Ɛit 
 
Table 5.2 presents the results for all three policymaking channels. The initial 
results seem to support the expectation of a weak link between public opinion and policy 
activities as well as party mandates and subsequent policymaking. In all models, the 
coefficient for the lagged public opinion variable is negative and even significant for 
questions. These results imply that the legislative agenda of the Turkish Parliament does 
not respond to the public priorities. The coefficient for the government and opposition 
party manifestos are also insignificant except for the parliamentary questions.  
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Table 5.2: Time-series Cross-sectional Model of Policymaking Agendas, 2002-2013 
 Laws Bills Questions 
Publict-1 -0.05 -0.02 -0.08*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Lawst-1 0.42*** - - 
 (0.13)   
Billst-1 - 0.76*** - 
  (0.06)  
Questionst-1 - - 0.47*** 
   (0.12) 
Gov Manifesto 0.08 0.02 -0.17** 
 (0.17) (0.08) (0.08) 
Opp Manifesto 0.17 0.08 0.38*** 
 (0.15) (0.08) (0.10) 
Constant 1.71*** 0.69** 1.79*** 
 (0.36) (0.27) (0.33) 
    
R-squared 0.33 0.78 0.40 
N 242 242 242 
                             Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses 
                             *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
The opposition manifesto has a positive and significant effect on oral questions. 
This finding is quite intuitive since for the opposition parties, there are fewer institutional 
barriers regarding oral questions and compared to the parliamentary bills and laws, 
opposition parties are freer to determine the agenda and follow their party mandate.  
In general, the results presented in Table 5.2 paint a discouraging picture for 
representation and responsiveness in Turkey as parties seem to respond neither to their 
election platforms, nor to the public priorities. However, as mentioned earlier, this 
dissertation offers an alternative strategy to measure party priorities by coding the 
manifesto pledges in each party manifesto instead of coding every sentence. In this 
respect, I run the same models with party pledges and compare the results in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3: Time-series Cross-sectional Model of Policymaking Agendas (including 
election pledges), 2002-2013 
 Laws Bills            Questions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Publict-1 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.08*** -0.08*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Lawst-1 0.42*** 0.44*** - - - - 
 (0.13) (0.13)     
Billst-1 - - 0.76*** 0.73*** - - 
   (0.06) (0.06)   
Questionst-1 - - - - 0.47*** 0.40*** 
     (0.12) (0.12) 
Gov. Manifesto 0.08 - 0.02 - -0.17** - 
 (0.17)  (0.08)  (0.01)  
Opp. Manifesto 0.17 - 0.08 - 0.38*** - 
 (0.15)  (0.08)  (0.10)  
Gov. Pledge - 0.22** - 0.14 - 0.18* 
  (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.10) 
Opp. Pledge - -0.09 - 0.03 - 0.15* 
  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08) 
Constant 1.71*** 2.05*** 0.69** 0.54** 1.79*** 1.56*** 
 (0.37) (0.44) (0.27) (0.26) (0.33) (0.38) 
       
R-squared 0.33 0.32 0.78 0.79 0.40 0.41 
N 242 242 242 242 242 242 
       Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
The results confirm my expectation regarding the party mandate. For the 
governing AKP, the coefficient for party pledges is significant for laws and oral 
questions. The coefficient for the CHP pledges, on the other hand, comes out significant 
only for the oral questions. For laws, the positive and significant coefficient of the 
government pledge variable means that the AKP was quite responsive to its electoral 
mandate while legislating. The positive and significant coefficient largely confirms my 
argument regarding party pledges and issue prioritization: Issues on which the party 
offers clear, identifiable policy commitments are prioritized when the government 
legislates.   
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In the same model, the opposition pledge variable is negative which implies that 
the governing AKP does not respond to the CHP’s electoral pledges and the opposition 
cannot influence the agenda of the government. These results lend some support to the 
issue ownership theory which argues that parties compete based on selective emphasis of 
issues. 
Similar to the models in Table 5.2, the opposition seems to be effective only in 
the domain of questions. However, the two models for oral questions present a striking 
difference. In the first model, which uses all manifesto mentions, the coefficient for the 
party manifesto variable is 0.38 (significant at p<0.01), whereas in the second model the 
coefficient of the pledge variable decreases to 0.15 while the level of statistical 
significance decreases from p<0.01 to p<0.1. This significant decrease implies that 
questions are a better tool for “rhetorical responsiveness” (Hobolt and Klemmensen 
2008) instead of substantive responsiveness.  
Although these results confirm that parties are responsive to their electoral 
mandate, they seem to be unresponsive to the public priorities. As in the previous 
chapters, in order to see the effect of public opinion on policymaking without the 
economy category, I run the same model by excluding this topic. Table 5.4 shows the 
results.  
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Table 5.4: Time-series Cross-sectional Model of Policymaking Agendas (economy 
category excluded), 2002-2013 
 Laws Bills Questions 
Publict-1 0.16*** 0.10** -0.02 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.021) 
Lawst-1 0.49*** - - 
 (0.13)   
Billst-1 - 0.69*** - 
  (0.07)  
Questionst-1 - - 0.50*** 
   (0.13) 
Gov. Pledge 0.27*** 0.22** 0.17 
 (0.107) (0.10) (0.10) 
Opp. Pledge -0.02 0.10 0.19** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) 
Constant 1.05** -0.04 0.92** 
 (0.43) (0.30) (0.40) 
    
R-squared 0.39 0.80 0.47 
N 231 231 231 
                        Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses 
                             *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As expected, the coefficient for the lagged public opinion variable becomes 
positive and significant for laws and parliamentary bills. Similar to the Table 5.3, the 
government pledge variable is significant, and the coefficient becomes even larger. The 
coefficient for the opposition pledge variable, on the other hand, is still negative and 
insignificant. For the parliamentary bills, government pledge variable is statistically 
significant, whereas opposition seems to have no significant influence. For the oral 
questions, the lagged public opinion variable is negative and insignificant. This finding 
once again confirms that oral questions are largely used for constituency service and 
more related to local politics. Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 present these effects graphically. 
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Figure 5.1: The Marginal Effect of the Public Opinion on Laws and Parliamentary 
Bills  
 
Note: Shaded Areas are the 95% Confidence Intervals 
 
Figure 5.1 shows that as public opinion moves from 0 to 40, the percentage of laws 
increases from 4 to 11 for laws and from 4 to 8 for parliamentary bills. 
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Figure 5.2: The Marginal Effect of the AKP Pledges on Laws versus Bills  
 
Note: Shaded Areas are the 95% Confidence Intervals 
 
According to Figure 5.2, AKP Pledges seem to have a greater effect on laws than 
parliamentary bills. As the percentage of AKP pledges moves from 0 to 20, the 
percentage of laws roughly increases from 4 to 8, whereas bills move roughly from 4 to 
7. Lastly, Figure 5.3 clearly illustrates the substantive difference between the AKP and 
CHP pledges. As CHP pledges change from 0 to 20, the percentage of laws decreases to 3 
from 4.  
 
 
119 
 
Figure 5.3: The Marginal Effect of the AKP and CHP Pledges on Laws  
 
Note: Shaded Areas are the 95% Confidence Intervals 
 
In sum, the results of the several analyses show that AKP used the distinct 
advantage of the governing party status and have been quite responsive the public 
priorities as well as its party mandate. So far, I have examined the legislative 
responsiveness at the aggregate level. Now, I will turn my attention to the party bills and 
analyze the responsiveness at the party level. To do that, I have separated the AKP and 
CHP bills and replicated the same model which I have used for the parliamentary bills. 
The party bills models take the following form: 
PARTY BILLS it = α0 + β1PUBLICit-1+ β2PARTY BILLSit-1 + β3GOVERNING PARTY 
PLEDGES+ β4OPPOSITION PARTY PLEDGES +  Ɛit 
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Table 5.5: Time-series Cross-sectional Model of Party Agendas, 2002-2013 
         Manifesto Mentions          Election Pledges 
 Model 1 
(AKP Bills) 
Model 2 
(CHP Bills) 
Model 3 
(AKP Bills) 
Model 4 
(CHP Bills) 
Publict-1 -0.08*** -0.05* -0.06* -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
PartyBillst-1 0.51*** 0.66*** 0.51*** 0.66*** 
 (0.01) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) 
Gov. Manifesto 0.26 0.15 - - 
 (0.16) (0.18)   
Opp. Manifesto 0.13 0.08 - - 
 (0.14) (0.15)   
Gov. Pledge - - 0.39* 0.20 
   (0.21) (0.19) 
Opp. Pledge - - -0.05 -0.01 
   (0.19) (0.14) 
Constant 2.16*** 1.27** 2.05*** 1.23** 
 (0.53) (0.63) (0.56) (0.61) 
     
R-squared 0.54 0.59 0.55 0.60 
N 126 155 126 155 
 Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As in the previous models, I run the analysis with the manifesto mentions and 
with election pledges. The results are presented in Table 5.5. The manifesto variables are 
insignificant in both models. The lagged public opinion variable is insignificant in the 
first three models. As expected, the government pledge variable is significant for the 
AKP bills meaning that AKP members are responsive to their electoral mandate when 
they are drafting bills.  
Finally, Table 5.6 presents the results with the economy category dropped. 
Similar to the previous models, the public opinion variable becomes significant for the 
AKP bills. The government pledge variable is quite large and significant. These results 
confirm the previous findings: the governing AKP is responsive to the public priorities 
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and its electoral mandate. For the CHP bills, the coefficient for the government pledge 
variable is a lot larger than the opposition variable (although both of them are 
insignificant) which implies that the governing AKP exerts greater influence even to the 
opposition agenda, whereas CHP members cannot influence the legislative agenda 
through parliamentary bills. I also present these effects graphically in Figure 5.4. 
 
Table 5.6: Time-series Cross-sectional Model of Party Agendas, (economy category 
dropped) 2002-2013. 
 Model 1 
AKP Bills 
Model 2 
CHP Bills 
Publict-1 0.08** 0.05 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
PartyBillst-1 0.46*** 0.64*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Gov. Pledge 0.52** 0.27 
 (0.23) (0.19) 
Opp. Pledge 0.10 0.06 
 (0.20) (0.15) 
Constant 0.65 0.45 
 (0.68) (0.56) 
   
R-squared 0.60 0.64 
N 116 144 
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 5.4: The Marginal Effects of Election Pledges on Party Bills  
 
Note: Shaded Areas are the 95% Confidence Intervals 
 
The Power of the Opposition? 
In general, these results challenge the findings of a growing literature which argue 
that the opposition can force the government to legislate in the direction that it favors 
(Green-Pedersen et al. 2012; Seeberg 2012; 2013a; 2013b). For example, Seeberg 
(2013a), argues that by successfully politicizing issues, the opposition parties can force 
the government to change the policies towards their preferred level since the governments 
want to prevent unwanted issue politicization. Seeberg’s study is focused on Denmark 
where coalition governments are common. Hence, these results might stem from the 
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peculiarities of the coalition politics. For example, opposition parties might use the 
cleavages between the governing parties to attack the government (Tzelgov, 2014). 
However, Seeberg (2013b) finds similar results for the UK. Focusing on the 
issues of crime, health, education, asylum/immigration, unemployment, tax, and the 
environment in the UK and Denmark, the author finds that the opposition successfully 
forces the governments to legislate in a way which moves policy closer to the 
opposition’s stance (Seeberg 2013b). My results, on the other hand, present a different 
picture: The main opposition CHP cannot exert any influence on the legislative agenda, 
and the governing AKP seems to be dominating the legislative agenda  
 
Summary 
In this chapter, I have argued that the policymaking agenda is jointly structured by 
the public priorities and parties’ long term policy commitments. Hence, in order to be 
able to analyze the true extend of policy responsiveness, a comprehensive approach that 
takes into account the party mandate is essential. The results of the several analysis 
strongly confirmed that Turkish parties are responsive to their electoral mandate as well 
as the public priorities.  
The governing party is significantly more responsive to the public priorities as 
well as its electoral mandate. My findings also underline the advantage of the governing 
status. Single party majority government status gave the AKP the chance to be responsive 
to the party platform as well as the priorities of the public. The opposition, on the other 
124 
 
hand, could only influence the legislative agenda through oral questions. Unlike the 
previous literature which found that opposition parties can force the governing party to 
legislate in the direction of its favored policy stance, I have found no effect of opposition 
party on legislation.  
This chapter has also offered an alternative measure of party priorities. Previous 
research has used manifesto sentences to measure party priorities. Studies of 
representation largely rely on this method to measure party preferences. This chapter 
argued that instead of coding each and every sentence, researchers should focus on the 
pledges in the manifestos. Using a strict definition of an election pledge, I was able to 
identify and code manifesto sentences that offer programmatic proposals and present 
measurable goals. In this respect, this research strategy enabled me to measure the 
substantive level of responsiveness.  
Pledges may also be considered better indicators of party issue ownership. It is 
plausible to assume that parties will be more likely to make pledges on issues that they 
give the utmost importance, and they feel most advantageous about. For example, a social 
democrat party is more likely to make election pledges on social policy and human rights, 
whereas a center right party is more likely to focus on crime and defense. This does not 
mean that parties will completely ignore other issues. Parties also include in their 
manifestos the issues that they give less priority, yet they use vague sentences and 
general statements regarding those issues.  
The findings of this chapter indicate that this distinction is crucial to identify the 
true party priorities. Using the conventional measure, I have found unresponsive parties. 
125 
 
However the replication of the analyses with the party pledge measure showed significant 
congruence between party priorities and subsequent policy actions. 
Opposition Influence 
In general, the finding that there is substantive responsiveness in the Turkish case 
is important in terms of democratic consolidation. Without question, a strong congruence 
between the public priorities and subsequent policy activities contributes positively to the 
strength of the democracy in a polity.  
Although the results presented in this Chapter and Chapter 3 showed that the 
governing AKP is quite responsive to the public priorities as well is its party platform, the 
opposition parties cannot exert any influence on the law-making agenda. The only policy 
channel through which the opposition can influence the legislative agenda is the oral 
questions. This finding is not surprising considering the strong parliamentary majority of 
the governing AKP.  
However, in the context of a consolidating country, this pattern might have 
negative effects on democratic consolidation. Seeing that their party cannot influence the 
policymaking process, the voters of the opposing parties might feel estranged from 
democratic politics. As a result, this might lead to reduced levels of turn out. This is 
especially problematic for a consolidating country such as Turkey which is deeply 
divided along secular-religious and ethnic cleavages. In this respect, at least some degree 
of opposition influence on the law-making agenda might be beneficial in order to make 
sure that “democracy is still the only game in town” (Linz and Stephan 1996).  
126 
 
In sum, the statistical evidence provided in this chapter shows that the governing 
AKP which heavily relies on clientelistic linkage mechanisms to connect with the voters 
is strongly responsive to its party mandate and public’s priorities. Together these findings 
show that the clientelistic linkage mechanisms do not isolate parties from the priorities of 
their constituencies, and clientelistic parties in weakly institutionalized party systems can 
develop programmatic policy proposals and act upon their electoral pledges when they 
are in office.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 
Normatively speaking, “a key characteristic of democracy is the continued 
responsiveness of the government to the preferences of the people” (Dahl 1971, 1). 
According to this view of representation, elected officials are expected to be responsive 
to the priorities of their constituents. In this respect, a strong linkage between parties’ 
promises and the actions of elected officials is also one of the observable features of a 
well-functioning democracy (Mansergh and Thomson 2007).  
 This study broadened our understanding of opinion to policy and program to 
policy linkage by moving beyond the context of the developed Western countries. So far, 
almost all studies that investigate the dynamics of these relationships have focused on 
Western countries with highly institutionalized party systems and dominantly 
programmatic parties. However, these party systems are inherently different from the 
party systems in the developing world.  
Most studies in the literature assume the context of institutionalized party systems 
with strong party roots in the society and further presuppose that programmatic linkages 
form the basis of the stable linkages between voters and parties (Mainwaring and Torcal 
2005). According to this framework, voters choose a party or candidate on the basis of 
their ideological and programmatic preferences. However, the party systems of most 
democracies and semi-democracies in less-developed countries are weakly 
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institutionalized, and in these countries, linkages between the voters and parties are 
usually less programmatic (Mainwaring and Torcal 2005). 
 As an alternative to the programmatic linkage mechanisms, parties in these 
countries use clientelistic or personalistic linkages. Clientelistic linkages rely on 
distributing selective benefits to individual voters or groups of voters who support the 
party. Personalistic linkages, on the other hand, usually involve the exposition of the 
appealing personal characteristics and charisma of a party’s leaders (Kitschelt et al. 
2010). Hence, unlike programmatic parties, who appeal the general public with 
programmatic proposals and by offering “public goods”, parties in these systems, focus 
on narrow sets of constituencies and rely on selective incentives and club goods.  
Previous research has suggested that clientelistic linkage mechanisms employed 
by parties insulate the policymakers from the policy priorities of their constituents since 
non-policy, selective benefits are substituted for the collective, policy-based benefits 
(Epstein 2009). Similarly, when electoral competition is centered on candidates’ qualities 
and personality, politicians rely less on parties’ programmatic stances for electoral 
support. As a result, this tendency prevents politicians to create well-structured party 
platforms on which to compete (Luna and Zechmeister 2005).  
Considering that highly institutionalized party systems are not prevalent in most 
countries (Mainwaring 1999; Mainwaring and Torcal 2006), understanding how weak 
party institutionalization affects the dynamics of opinion to policy and program to policy 
linkage is paramount for the study of representation. 
This dissertation has focused on Turkey, which offers an excellent case for 
studying the effect of clientelistic and personalistic linkage mechanisms on 
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representation.  Turkey’s governing AKP is ranked as the most clientelistic party in the 
world, according to the DALP dataset. In terms of personalistic linkage mechanisms, 
Turkey is also a very relevant case.  
AKP leader Tayyip Erdogan has ruled the party from 2002 until his recent 
presidential election victory in August 2014. During his leadership Erdogan largely relied 
on his charisma and led the election campaigns by himself. Even after leaving his 
position as the party leader, Erdogan’s charisma still contributes greatly to the party’s 
success. For example, according to the results of a recent public opinion poll, 50% of the 
AKP supporters (roughly 25 percent of the electorate) told that they will vote for AKP 
due to their support for Erdogan.15 
To test how well representation works in a weakly institutionalized party setting, I 
collected a novel dataset which contains over 13000 parliamentary documents (laws, 
parliamentary bills and oral questions) and over 10000 manifesto sentences as well as the 
most important problem question of public opinion surveys for a period of 11 years. In 
order to obtain comparable measures of public preferences, party preferences as well as 
party issue focus in the legislature, these documents have been hand-coded according to 
the common coding scheme of the Comparative Agendas Project. 
The findings of the several analyses show that when parties are able to establish 
track records through re-election, they can be responsive to public preferences and their 
electoral mandates. The relative stability of the Turkish party system in the last decade 
paved the way for responsive parties even in an environment where clientelistic linkage 
                                                          
15 For the detailed results see: http://www.kamuajans.com/siyaset/haber/son-anketlere-gore-partilerin-oy-
oranlari-464006.html  
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mechanisms are prevalent. The results of my dissertation suggest that clientelism is not 
an obstacle for a responsive government.  
Chapter 3 of this dissertation has showed that the responsiveness of the legislature 
was highest for the domain of laws (compared to parliamentary bills and oral questions). 
Without having to deal with complex coalition bargaining and accommodating rival 
political parties’ policy demands, the AKP government had a distinct advantage to follow 
public priorities.  
In order to see the effect of public opinion on policymaking at the party level, 
Chapter 4 focused on party bills. However, the results of the chapter provided no 
evidence for party level variation. On the other hand, the topic distribution patterns 
suggested that right wing and left wing niche parties are beginning to form as these 
parties have started to own certain issues.  
In chapter 5, I incorporated party preferences into the analysis by using election 
manifestos. This chapter has also offered an alternative strategy to measure party 
priorities. Unlike the previous studies that utilize all the sentences in the manifestos, I 
have focused on the election pledges and compared the results with the models using 
election manifestos. Using a strict definition of an election pledge offered two distinct 
advantages. First, using this method, I was able to identify the programmatic proposals 
and thereby measure the level of programmatism in each manifesto. Second, this method 
enabled me to identify the sentences which reflect the true priorities of the parties. The 
results of the analyses with party manifestos versus election pledges confirmed my 
expectations as parties are more responsive to the election pledges. 
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The findings of this chapter showed that parties not only follow the public 
priorities, but also pay attention to their election platform. These two variables, on the 
other hand, exert varying levels of influence for each policymaking channel. The 
governing AKP’s election pledges are an important indicator of party lawmaking activity. 
In other words, the party pays attention to its election pledges when it passes a law or a 
party member drafts a bill.  
For the opposition party CHP, the result are different. CHP’s election pledges 
cannot exert any influence on the political agenda for laws and bills. The governing AKP 
does not pay attention to the CHP’s election pledges and focusses on its own agenda 
while legislating. For oral questions, on the other hand, CHP’s party pledges seem to 
have a significant effect. This finding is plausible considering that there are few structural 
barriers for submitting oral questions compared to drafting bills or passing a legislation.  
In sum, this study opens new venues for further research by bridging two 
literatures: the literature on opinion and policy linkage and the literature on program to 
policy linkage and moving from strongly institutionalized western party systems to a 
weakly institutionalized party system with clientelistic parties. The results of this study 
show that at least for the case of Turkey, weak party institutionalization and clientelism 
do not jeopardize democratic representation. The governing AKP which heavily relies on 
clientelistic and personalistic linkage mechanisms, develops and implements 
programmatic policy proposals and prioritizes issues that are salient to the general public.   
These findings imply that parties that widely rely on clientelistic linkage 
mechanisms also pay attention to the public priorities. Parties follow mixed strategies in 
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order to increase their votes. Normatively, this finding has important implications for 
democratic representation. Successfully combining clientelistic policies with 
programmatic party policies might create lead to higher policy responsiveness. If parties 
can maintain a balance between clientelistic policies which rely more on individual 
relations with the constituents and still develop and deliver programmatic party 
proposals, democratic representation might improve.  
 
Suggestions for Future Work and Implications for Consolidating Democracies 
This dissertation has focused on a weakly institutionalized party system with 
highly clientelistic parties. The fact that AKP is ranked as the most clientelistic party in 
the world offers a very tough test regarding the effect of clientelistic linkage mechanisms 
on representation and responsiveness. For future research, I would suggest to include 
additional countries to the analyses with varying degrees of clientelistic linkage 
mechanisms and party system institutionalization to ensure that my findings are not 
country specific. The level of decentralization in the country might also have an impact 
on responsiveness. Previous studies have shown that there is significant variation in issue 
attention between level of government and across regional government (Chaques-
Bonafont and Palau 2011). In this regard, parties and politicians in federal systems might 
be more responsive to their own constituents and less to the general public.  
Future analysis should also expand the time period under study. In this 
dissertation, I have focused on a time period when a single party formed the government 
with a strong parliamentary majority. However, the type of government might have an 
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impact on policy responsiveness as the ability of parties to deliver their policy 
commitments change. Coalition governments can change the level of responsiveness in 
various ways. First, more parties have access to government resources and therefore have 
a better chance to be responsive to their electoral mandate. Second, intra-coalition 
dynamics might force parties to be less responsive to the mean party supporter and more 
responsive to the mean voter. For example, in the case of a coalition between a center 
right and a right wing party, the right wing party might moderate its stance and focus less 
on the issue of immigration and more on economy. 
The results of this dissertation imply that oral questions and to certain extend 
parliamentary bills are used for constituency service. Parliamentary questions are widely 
used in the literature to measure parties’ issue focus. In order to make sure to measure the 
party issue focus instead of the legislators’ own constituency related concerns, future 
studies should separate the questions that are drafted for constituency service. Refining 
the questions in this way will ensure that party priorities are measured and hence provide 
more reliable results. 
Additionally, future studies should pay closer attention to the electoral politics. 
Legislators might show variation in responsiveness depending on the level of electoral 
contestation in their district. For example, legislators from party strongholds and safe 
districts might be less responsive to the priorities of their own constituents and more 
responsive to the general public opinion. Similarly, there might be country level 
differences depending on the electoral systems. For example, legislators in close list 
proportional representation (PR) systems might be more concerned with the general 
public opinion compared to legislators in open list PR or single transferable vote (STV).  
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Future studies should also integrate a saliency approach into the analysis. 
Previous studies have shown that the elected representatives ask more questions about 
issues the media have paid attention to (Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2011). In this respect, 
how media prioritizes issues and whether the salient issues in the media affect public 
opinion, or the legislative politics is crucial to understand the policy-making agenda.  
 My final suggestion is regarding the general approach used by CAP scholars. In 
this dissertation, I have used a measure of policy attention that focuses on the aggregate 
number of laws, bills, and questions. Although this research strategy does not pose a 
significant problem for parliamentary bills and oral questions, using it for the laws can be 
problematic. During their tenure, governments pass important amount of laws in several 
areas. However, not all laws are the same in terms of their level of significance. In reality, 
laws differ in their degree of importance. Some laws effect a significant majority of the 
population, whereas some laws are passed due to legal requirements. To illustrate, I will 
give two examples from Turkish politics related to education.  
 In 2012, the AKP government passed a law which made it compulsory for every 
student to finish high school. The law, usually known as Compulsory Education Act, 
affected millions of students and their families as the compulsory education increased 
from eight years to twelve years. Further, number of years for the elementary school was 
reduced to four years as the fifth grade was abolished and added to the middle school. To 
sum up, the law imposed dramatic changes to the educational life in the country, and it 
had substantive impact on students, their families, and educators. In Turkey, the 
establishment of new universities is also subject to legislative approval, meaning that a 
bill proposing the foundation of the new university must be passed. In this respect, the 
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law that approves the founding of a small private university has the same weight with the 
law that radically changes the education system in Turkey.  
 As the empirical chapters have shown, for the topic of economy, there is a 
significant gap between public opinion and law-making. However, these results might 
change once the legislative significance is taken into account. Governments might pass 
fewer laws than the public supposedly requires, but these laws might be substantive both 
in terms of their scope and impact.  
 To remedy this problem, scholars of CAP have used several methods. For 
example, Baumgartner and Jones’s (2002; 2004) American Policy Agendas Project 
collects information on every public statute enacted since 1948 and identify the important 
enactments based on the number of column lines devoted to each enactment in the 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac. Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2010) adopt a similar 
approach and use the length of debates (in columns) assuming that lengthy debates arise 
only on issues that many parties from both government and opposition deem important. 
These methods might provide a proxy for the significance of the legislation, and future 
studies should include similar weights in their analyses.  
 
 
 
 
 
136 
 
References 
 
Adams, James, Andrea B. Haupt, and Heather Stoll. 2009. “What Moves Parties? The 
Role of Public Opinion and Global Economic Conditions in Western Europe.” 
Comparative Political Studies 42 (5): 611-639. 
Adams, James, Michael Clark, Lawrence Ezrow, and Garrett Glasgow. 2004. 
“Understanding Change and Stability in Party Ideologies: Do Parties Respond to Public 
Opinion or to Past Election Results?” British Journal of Political Science 34 (4): 589-
610. 
Adams, James, Michael Clark, Lawrence Ezrow, and Garrett Glasgow. 2006. “Are Niche 
Parties Fundamentally Different than Mainstream Parties? The Causes and the Electoral 
Consequences of Western European Parties’ Policy Shifts, 1976-1998.” American 
Journal of Political Science 50 (3): 513-529. 
Alesina, Alberto and Howard Rosenthal. 1995. Partisan Politics, Divided Government 
and the Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
APSA. 1950. “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of the 
Committee on Political Parties.” American Political Science Review 44 (3).  
Arnold, Donald R. 1990. The Logic of Congressional Action. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
UniversityPress. 
Aydogan, Abdullah and Jonathan B. Slapin. N.d. “Left-Right Reversed: Parties and 
Ideology in Modern Turkey.” Party Politics. 
Baumgartner, Frank R. and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. Agendas and Instability in American 
Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Benoit, Kenneth, and Michael Laver. 2006. Party Policy in Modern Democracies. 
London: Routledge. 
Bértoa, Fernando C. 2014. “Party Systems and Cleavage Structures Revisited: A 
Sociological Explanation of Party System Institutionalization in East Central Europe.” 
Party Politics 20 (1): 16-36. 
Bevan, Shaun and Will Jennings. 2014. “Representation, Agendas and Institutions.” 
European Journal of Political Research 53 (1): 37-56. 
Booth, Eric and Joseph Robbins. 2010. “Assessing the Impact of Campaign Finance on 
Party System Institutionalization.” Party Politics 16: 629. 
137 
 
Bräuninger Thomas and Marc Debus. 2009. “Legislative Agenda-Setting in 
Parliamentary Democracies.” European Journal of Political Research 48: 804-839. 
Budge, Ian and Dennis Farlie. 1983. Explaining and Predicting Elections: Issue Effects 
and Party Strategies in Twenty-Three Democracies. Allen & Unwin, London 
Budge, Ian, Hans D. Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, and Eric Tanenbaum. 
2001. Mapping Policy Preferences Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 
1945-1998. Oxford University Press. 
Burden, Barry. 2007. Personal Roots of Representation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Burstein, Paul. 1998. Discrimination, Jobs, and Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Carrubba, Clifford J., Matthew Gabel, Lacey Murrah, Ryan Clough, Elizabeth 
Montgomery, and Rebecca Schambach. 2006. “Off the Record: Unrecorded Legislative 
Votes, Selection Bias and Roll-Call Vote Analysis.” British Journal of Political Science 
36 (4): 691-70. 
Chaqués, Laura, Anna M. Palau, and Luz Muñoz. 2011. “Assessing the Responsiveness 
of Spanish Policymakers to the Priorities of their Citizens.” West European Politics 34 
(4): 706-730. 
Chaqués, Laura, Anna M. Palau. 2011. “Comparing Law-making Activities in a Quasi-
Federal System of Government: the Case of Spain.” Comparative Political Studies. 
44(8): 1089–1119. 
Converse, Philips E. 1964. “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics.” In 
Ideology and Discontent, ed. David Apter. New York: Free Press, 206-264. 
Costello, Rory and Robert Thomson. 2008. “Election Pledges and their Enactment in 
Coalition Governments: A Comparative Analysis of Ireland.” Journal of Elections, 
Public Opinion and Parties 18 (3): 239-256. 
Croissant, Aurel and Philip Volkel. 2012. “Party System Types and Party System 
Institutionalization: Comparing New Democracies in East and Southeast Asia.” Party 
Politics 18: 235. 
Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
Dalton, Russell J. and Martin Wattenberg, eds. 2000. Parties without Partisans: Political 
Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
138 
 
Dalton, Russell J. and Steven Weldon. 2007. “Partisanship and Party System 
Institutionalization.” Party Politics 13: 179. 
Däubler, Thomas, Kenneth Benoit, Slava Mikhaylov, and Michael Laver. 2012. “Natural 
Sentences as Valid Units for Coded Political Texts.” British Journal of Political Science 
42: 937-951. 
Dietz, Henry A. and David Myers. 2007. “From Thaw to Deluge: Party System Collapse 
in Venezuela and Peru.” Latin American Politics and Society 49 (2): 59-86. 
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper. 
Duch, Raymond M. and Randy Stevenson. 2010. “The Global Economy, Competency, 
and the Economic Vote.” The Journal of Politics 72 (1): 105-123. 
Epstein, Daniel J. 2009. “Clientelism Versus Ideology Problems of Party Development in 
Brazil.” Party Politics 15: 335-355. 
Erikson, Robert S., Michael B. MacKuen, and James A. Stimson. 2002. The Macro 
Polity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Erus, Burcay and Nazli Aktakke. 2012. “Impact of Healthcare Reforms on Out-of-Pocket 
Health Expenditures in Turkey for Public Insures.” The European Journal of Health 
Economics 13 (3): 337-346. 
Ezrow, Lawrence and Timothy Hellwig. 2011. “Responding to Voters or Responding to 
Markets? Political Parties and Public Opinion in an Era of Globalization.” Presented at 
the European Political Science Association General Conference, Dublin, Ireland, 16-18 
June. 
Ezrow, Lawrence, Catherine E. De Vries, Marco Steenbergen, and Erica E. Edwards. 
2011. “Mean Voter Representation and Partisan Constituency Representation: Do Parties 
Respond to the Mean Voter Position or to their Supporters?” Party Politics 17(3): 275-
301. 
Ezrow, Lawrence. 2010. Linking Citizens and Parties. How Electoral Systems Matter for 
Political Representation. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Froio, Caterina, Shaun Bevan, and Will Jennings. 2013. “Mandates, Agendas and 
Representation: Party Platforms, Policy Agendas and the Public Agenda in Britain, 1983-
2008”, Presented at the Comparative Agendas Project Annual Meeting, Antwerp, 
Belgium. 
Fuchs, Dieter and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 1990. “The Left-Right Schema.” In 
Continuities in Political Action: A Longitudinal Study of Political Orientations in Three 
139 
 
Western Democracies, eds. M. Kent Jennings, Jan W. van Deth, et al. Berlin; New York: 
Walter de Gruyter. 
Green, Jane. 2007. "When Voters and Parties Agree: Valence Issues and Party 
Competition." Political Studies 55(3): 629-655. 
Greene, Zachary, Caterina Froio, and Shaun Bevan. 2014. “The Electoral Consequences 
of Government Accountability: Evidence from the United Kingdom.” Presented at the 
American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington DC.  
Green-Pedersen, Christoffer, Peter Mortensen, Henrik B. Seeberg, and Gunnar Thesen. 
2012. “The Power of the Opposition.” Perspectives on Europe 42 (2): 54-59. 
Green-Pedersen, Christopher and Peter Mortensen. 2010. “Who Sets the Agenda and 
Who Responds to it in the Danish Parliament? A New Model of Issue Competition and 
Agenda Setting.” European Journal of Political Research 49 (2): 257-281. 
Gumuscu, Sebnem. 2012. “The Emerging Predominant Party System in Turkey.” 
Government and Opposition 48 (2): 223-244. 
Hall, Richard L. 1996. Participation in Congress. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press. 
Hartley, Thomas and Bruce Russett. 1992. “Public Opinion and the Common Defense: 
Who governs Military Spending in the United States.” American Political Science Review 
86 (4): 905-915. 
Hobolt, Sara B. and Robert Klemmensen. 2005. “Responsive Government? Public 
Opinion and Government Policy Preferences in Britain and Denmark.” Political Studies 
53 (2): 379-402. 
Hobolt, Sara B. and Robert Klemmensen. 2008. “Government Responsiveness and 
Political Competition in Comparative Perspective.” Comparative Political Studies 41 (3): 
309-337. 
Hug, Simon. 2009. “Selection Effects in Roll Call Votes.” British Journal of Political 
Science 40: 225-235. 
Huntington, Samuel. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Inglehart, Ronald F. 1990. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Inglehart, Ronald F. 2008. “Changing Values among Western Publics from 1970 to 
2006.” West European Politics, 31(1): 130-146. 
140 
 
Jacobs, Lawrence R. 1993. The Health of Nations: Public Opinion and the Making of 
American and British Health Policy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Janda, Kenneth. 1980. Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey. London: Macmillan. 
Jennings, Will and Christopher Wlezien. 2011. “Distinguishing Between Most Important 
Problems and Issues?”  Public Opinion Quarterly 75 (3): 545-555. 
Jennings, Will and Peter John. 2009. “The Dynamics of Political Attention: Public 
Opinion and the Queen's Speech in the United Kingdom.” American Journal of Political 
Science 53 (4): 838-54. 
Jennings, Will, Shaun Bevan, and Peter John. 2011. “The Agenda of British Government: 
The Speech from the Throne, 1911-2008.” Political Studies 59: 74-98. 
Jones, Bryan D. 1994. Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics: Attention, 
Choice and Public Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Jones, Bryan D. and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2004. “Representation and Agenda Setting.” 
Policy Studies Journal 32: 1-24. 
Jones, Bryan D. and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2005. The Politics of Attention: How 
Government Prioritizes Problems. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Jones, Bryan D., Heather Larsen-Price, and John Wilkerson. 2009. “Representation in 
American Governing Institutions.” Journal of Politics 71: 277-90. 
Kingdon, John. 1984. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. New York: Harper 
Collins. 
Kitschelt, Herbert and Matthew Singer. 2011. “‘Do Everything’ (DoE) Parties: When 
Can Politicians Combine Clientelistic and Programmatic Appeals?” Working Paper. 
Kitschelt, Herbert, Kirk Hawkins, Juan Pablo Luna, Guillermo Rosas, and Elizabeth 
Zechmeister. 2010. Latin American Party Systems. Cambridge University Press. 
Kitschelt, Herbert. 1994. The Transformation of European Social Democracy. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Kitschelt, Herbert. 2000. “Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic 
Politics.” Comparative Political Studies 33: 845-79. 
Kitschelt, Herbert. 2011. “Do Institutions Matter for Parties’ Electoral Linkage 
Strategies?” Presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 
Seattle. 
141 
 
Kitschelt, Herbert. 2012. “The Development Hypothesis in the Comparative Analysis of 
Linkage Profiles. Power and Limitations: The Need for a Political Economy 
Perspective.” 2012 IDEA Project Report. 
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, Ian Budge, and Michael 
McDonald. 2006. Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors and 
Governments in Central and Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990–2003. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Richard I. Hofferbert, and Ian Budge. 1994. Parties, Policies 
and Democracy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Kluver, Heike and Jae-Jae Spoon N.d. “Who Responds? Voters, Parties, and Issue 
Attention.” British Journal of Political Science. 
Lindberg, Staffan I. 2007. “Institutionalization of Party Systems? Stability and Fluidity 
among Legislative Parties in Africa's Democracies.” Government and Opposition 42 (2): 
215-241. 
Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
Lipset, Seymour and Stein Rokkan. 1967. Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-
National Perspectives. Toronto: The Free Press. 
Luna, Juan P. and Elizabeth Zechmeister. 2005. “Political Representation in Latin 
America - A Study of Elite-Mass Congruence in Nine Countries.” Comparative Political 
Studies 38 (4): 388-416. 
MacDonald, Elaine, Ola Listhaug, and George Rabinowitz. 1991. “Issues and Party 
Support in Multiparty Systems.” The American Journal of Political Science 85(4): 472-
488. 
Mainwaring, Scott and Edurne Zoco. 2007. “Political Sequences and the Stabilization of 
Interparty Competition: Electoral Volatility in Old and New Democracies.” Party Politics 
13 (2): 155-78. 
Mainwaring, Scott and Mariano Torcal. 2005. “Party System Institutionalization and 
Party System Theory After the Third Wave of Democratization.” Kellogg Institute for 
International Studies Working Paper 319. 
Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy Scully, eds. 1995. Building Democratic Institutions: 
Party Systems in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
142 
 
Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy Scully. 1995. “Introduction: Party Systems in Latin 
America.” In Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America, eds. 
Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Mainwaring, Scott. 1998. “Rethinking Party Systems Theory in the Third Wave of 
Democratization: The Importance of Party System Institutionalization.” Kellogg Institute 
for International Studies Working Paper 260, University of Notre Dame. 
Mainwaring, Scott. 1999. Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of 
Democratization: The Case of Brazil. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Mansbergh Lucy and Robert Thomson. 2007. “Election Pledges, Party Competition, and 
Policymaking.” Comparative Politics 39 (3): 311-329. 
Manza, Jeff, and Cook, Fay Lomax. 2002. “Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion: 
The State of the Debate.” In Navigating Public Opinion: Polls, Policy and the Future of 
American Democracy, eds. Heff Manza, Fay L. Cook, and Benjamin I. Page. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Maravall, José María. 1999. “Accountability and Manipulation.” In Democracy, 
Accountability and Representation, eds. Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard 
Manin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Martin, Shane. 2011. “Using Parliamentary Questions to Measure Constituency Focus: 
An Application to the Irish Case.” Political Studies 59 (2): 472-488. 
McDonald, Michael D., Ian Budge, and Paul Pennings. 2004. “Party Reactions to Public 
Concerns.” European Journal of Political Research 43 (6): 845-868. 
Özbudun, Ergun. 1981. “The Turkish Party System: Institutionalization, Polarization, and 
Fragmentation.” Middle Eastern Studies 17 (2): 228-240. 
Özbudun, Ergun. 2006, “From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of 
the Justice and Development Party in Turkey.” South European Society and Politics 11 
(3-4): 543-557. 
Özbudun, Ergun. 2006. “Changes and Continuities in the Turkish Party System.” 
Representation 42 (2): 129-37. 
Page, Benjamin, and Robert Shapiro. 1983. “Effects of Public Opinion on Policy.” 
American Political Science Review 77 (1): 175-190.  
Pennings, Paul. 2005. “Parties, Voters and Policy Priorities in the Netherlands, 1971-
2002.” Party Politics 11(1): 29-45. 
143 
 
Petrocik, John R. 1996. “Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case 
Study.” American Journal of Political Science 40 (3): 825-850. 
Przeworski, Adam, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, eds. 1999. Democracy, 
Accountability and Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Royed, Terry J. 1996. “Testing the Mandate Model in Britain and the United States: 
Evidence from the Reagan and Thatcher Eras.” British Journal of Political Science 26 
(1): 45-80. 
Royed, Terry J. and Stephen A. Borelli. 1999. “The Politics and Economics of Revenue 
Growth: A Cross-National Analysis.” European Journal of Political Research 36 (1): 87-
118. 
Sambur, Bilal. 2009. “The Great Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey:The Case of 
Justice and Development Party and Erdogan.” European Journal of Economic and 
Political Studies 2 (2): 117-127. 
Sayari, Sabri. 2007. “Towards a New Turkish Party System?” Turkish Studies 8 (2): 197-
210. 
Sayari, Sabri. 2008. “Non-Electoral Sources of Party System Change in Turkey.” In 
Essays in Honor of Ergun Özbudun, eds. Serap Yazıcı, Kemal Gözler, Fuat Keyman, Ece 
Göztepe, and Ergun Özbudun, Istanbul Yetkin Yayınları, 399-417. 
Sayarı, Sabri. 2011. “Clientelism and Patronage in Turkish Politics and Society.” In The 
Post Modern Abyss and the New Politics of Islam: Assabiyah, Revisited Essays in Honor 
of Şerif Mardin, eds. Binnaz Toprak and Faruk Birtek. Istanbul Bilgi University Press 
355. 
Schlesinger, Joseph. 1984 “On the Theory of Party Organization.” Journal of Politics 46: 
369-400. 
Schüler, Harald. 1999. Türkiye’de Sosyal Demokrasi: Particilik, Hemşehrilik, Alevilik. 
İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları. 
Seeberg, Henrik B. 2012. “Oppositions, Governments and Policy Changes.” Master’s 
thesis. University of Aarhus, Denmark. 
Seeberg, Henrik B. 2013. “The Opposition's Policy Influence through Issue 
Politicisation.” Journal of Public Policy 33: 89-107 
Seeberg, Henrik B. 2013. “The Power of the Loser: Opposition Policy Influence through 
Agenda-Setting.” PhD. diss. University of Aarhus, Denmark. 
144 
 
Soroka, Stuart N. and Christopher Wlezien. 2005. “Opinion–Policy Dynamics: Public 
Preferences and Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom.” British Journal of Political 
Science 35: 665-689. 
Soroka, Stuart N. and Christopher Wlezien. 2010. Degrees of Democracy: Politics, 
Public Opinion and Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Stein, Ernesto, Mariano Tommasi, Koldo Echebarria, Eduardo Lora, and Mark Payne, 
eds. 2006. The Politics of Policies. Economic and Social Progress in Latin America. 
Cambridge: David Rockefeller Center. 
Stimson, James A., Michael B. MacKuen, and Robert S. Erikson. 1995. “Dynamic 
Representation.” American Political Science Review 89: 543-65. 
Ström, Kaare, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjön Bergman, eds. 2003. Delegation and 
Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Sulkin, Tracy. 2005. Issue Politics in Congress. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Thomson, Robert. 2001. “The Programme-to-Policy Linkage: the Fulfilment of Election 
Pledges on Socioeconomic Policy in the Netherlands, 1986-1998.” European Journal of 
Political Research 40: 171-197. 
Tzelgov, Eitan. 2014. “Cross-Cutting Issues, Intraparty Dissent and Party Strategy: The 
Issue of European Integration in the House of Commons.” European Union Politics 15 
(1): 3-23 
Vliegenthart, Rens and Stefaan Walgrave. 2011. “Content Matters. The Dynamics of 
Parliamentary Questioning in Belgium and Denmark.” Comparative Political Studies 44 
(8): 1031-1059. 
Vliegenthart, Rens, Stefaan Walgrave, and Brandon Zica. 2013. “How Preferences, 
Information and Institutions Interactively Drive Agenda-Setting: Questions in the Belgian 
Parliament, 1993–2000.” European Journal of Political Research 52: 390-418. 
Vliegenthart, Rens, Stefaan Walgrave, and Connie Meppelink. 2011.  “Interparty 
Agenda-Setting in Belgian Parliament. The Role of Party Characteristics and 
Competition.” Political Studies 59 (2): 368-188. 
Wlezien, Chris. 2003. “Patterns of Representation: Dynamics of Public Preferences and 
Policy.” Journal of Politics 66 (1): 1-24. 
Wlezien, Christopher .2005. “On the Salience of Political Issues: The Problem with Most 
Important Problem.” Electoral Studies 24 (4): 555-79. 
145 
 
Wlezien, Christopher. 1995. “The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for 
Spending.” The American Political Science Review 89: 981-1000. 
 
